Suppose there are two competing hospitals in a region facing the samecommon dema
ID: 1109659 • Letter: S
Question
Suppose there are two competing hospitals in a region facing the samecommon demand for medical care
that can be represented by the following demand equation and each firm possesses the same marginal cost
(MC) of producing medical care, determine the Cournot equilibrium
for the model. How is this different from a perfectly competitive setting?
How is it different from a monopoly setting? What are the total profits
earned under each of these scenarios?
a.
P=400-10Q
MC=10
b.
P=200-4Q
MC=10
c.
P=1000 - 20Q
MC=20
Explanation / Answer
a) Under cournot competition:
Response function of firm a : Profita = (400-10(qa+qb))qa - 10
or Profita = 400qa - 10qa2 -10qaqb - 10
To maximize profit dProfita/dqa = 0
400 - 20qa -10qb = 0
or qa = 20-0.5qb ........ eq i
Similarly,
response function of firm b: Profitb = (400-10(qa+qb))qb - 10
or Profitb = 400qb - 10qb2 -10qaqb - 10
To maximize profit dProfitb/dqb = 0
400 - 20qb -10qa = 0
or qa = 40-2qb ........ eq ii
from eq i and ii
40-2qb = 20-0.5qb
qb = 13.33
and hence qa = 40-2(13.33) = 13.33
and P = 400 - 10(13.33+13.33) = $133.33
Each firm's profit = (400-10(13.33+13.33))13.33 - 10 = $1768.22
Now, Under Monopoly:
TR = P*Q = (400-10Q)Q = 400Q-10Q2
MR = dTR/dQ = 400 - 20Q
Equate MR with MC
400-20Q = 10
Q = 19.5
at P = 400-10(19.5) = $205.
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