Question: 1. Recall the sequential Dating game. First, the husband chooses to go

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Question: 1. Recall the sequential Dating game. First, the husband chooses to go to the boxing match or to ... 1. Recall the sequential Dating game. First, the husband chooses to go to the boxing match or to the opera. Given the husbands choice, the wife chooses to go to the boxing match or to the opera. The husband prefers the boxing match and the wife prefers the opera but each of them prefers to go to an event together than to go the separate events. What can you say about the existence of mixed strategy Nash equilibria in this game? In particular, if there is perfect information (i.e., no simultaneous move stages, no information sets, and no uncertainty), is it true that the backward induction procedure only provides pure strategy Nash equilibria? 2. What is the discounted lifetime pay of the following payoff sequence when the discount factor is : 3, 1, 3, 1, 3, 1, 3, ... 3. What is the payoff from above if = 1/2, = 1/4?

Explanation / Answer

1. The mixed startaegynash equilibrium in teh sequential move game is called the bayesian nash equilibrium . Yes, in case of imperfect information wherein the players doesnt know which node has been reached in such a case backward induction only provides with the pure staregy nash equilibrium There are many equilibrium that are never played becasue of the uncertainity factor and the credibility of such actions

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