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In some markets, e.g., liquor in Rhode Island, firms are allowed to advertise bu

ID: 1207070 • Letter: I

Question

In some markets, e.g., liquor in Rhode Island, firms are allowed to advertise but are not allowed to mention prices or the existence of a sale. Suppose we have a good with a market demand Q = 100 - P. Suppose that there are two firms, each with the same constant marginal cost: c = 20. Those two firms share the monopoly profit. If firms spend a_1 and a_2 in advertising, then firm l's share is a_1/a_1+a_2 and firm 2's share is a_2/a_1+a_2. If neither firm advertises (a_1 = a_2 = 0), then each firm's share is 1/2. Write down the monopoly profit in this market. What is the profit maximizing price? What is the corresponding profit? Let n be this profit. Suppose both firms advertise: firm l's profit is a_2/a_1+a_2 Pi-a_1 and firm 2's profit is a_2/a_1+a_2 Pi-a_2(with Pi being the profit you found in question a). Firms choose their advertising expenditures in order to maximize their profits. What are the advertising expenditures a_1 and a_2 in equilibrium? What is each firm's profit when both firms advertise? Suppose neither firm advertises. What is each firm's profit? Will firms choose to advertise in equilibrium? Is that a Pareto efficient situation? Explain.

Explanation / Answer

a. Monopoly Profit = P*Q - TC = (100 - Q)*Q - MC*Q =  (100 - Q)*Q - 20*Q

dProfit/dQ = 100 - 2Q - 20

Putting dProfit/dQ = 0

80 - 2Q = 0

Q = 40

P = 100 - Q = 100 -40 = 60

Profit = 60*40 - 20*40 = 1,600

b.

Profit1 = (a1/a1+a2) - a1

differentiating wrt a1

dProfit/da1 = a2/(a1+a2)^2* - 1

Putting

dProfit/da1 = a2/(a1+a2)^2* - 1 = 0

a2/(a1+a2)^2* = 1

a2 = (a1+a2)^2/

Similarly

   Profit2 = (a2/a1+a2) - a2

differentiating wrt a2

dProfit/da2 = a1/(a1+a2)^2* - 1

Putting

dProfit/da1 = a1/(a1+a2)^2* - 1 = 0

a1/(a1+a2)^2* = 1

a1 = (a1+a2)^2/

so,

a1 = a2 = (a1+a2)^2/

Putting = 1,600

So a1 = a2 = 400

So, Profit of firm1 = /2 - a = 1600/2 - 400 = 400

   Profit of firm2 = /2 - a = 1600/2 - 400 = 400

c If neither firm advertises then

  Profit of firm1 =Profit of firm2 = /2 = 1600/2 = 800

d.

Yes , firms will chose to advertize in equilibrium , yes that will be a pareto efficient because in that case one can make one firm better off without making other worse off , i.e increasing one firm's profit without reducing other firm profit.

If you don't understand anything, then comment, I will revert back on the same.

And If you liked the answer then please do review the same. Thanks :)

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