In some markets, e.g., liquor in Rhode Island, firms are allowed to advertise bu
ID: 1207070 • Letter: I
Question
In some markets, e.g., liquor in Rhode Island, firms are allowed to advertise but are not allowed to mention prices or the existence of a sale. Suppose we have a good with a market demand Q = 100 - P. Suppose that there are two firms, each with the same constant marginal cost: c = 20. Those two firms share the monopoly profit. If firms spend a_1 and a_2 in advertising, then firm l's share is a_1/a_1+a_2 and firm 2's share is a_2/a_1+a_2. If neither firm advertises (a_1 = a_2 = 0), then each firm's share is 1/2. Write down the monopoly profit in this market. What is the profit maximizing price? What is the corresponding profit? Let n be this profit. Suppose both firms advertise: firm l's profit is a_2/a_1+a_2 Pi-a_1 and firm 2's profit is a_2/a_1+a_2 Pi-a_2(with Pi being the profit you found in question a). Firms choose their advertising expenditures in order to maximize their profits. What are the advertising expenditures a_1 and a_2 in equilibrium? What is each firm's profit when both firms advertise? Suppose neither firm advertises. What is each firm's profit? Will firms choose to advertise in equilibrium? Is that a Pareto efficient situation? Explain.Explanation / Answer
a. Monopoly Profit = P*Q - TC = (100 - Q)*Q - MC*Q = (100 - Q)*Q - 20*Q
dProfit/dQ = 100 - 2Q - 20
Putting dProfit/dQ = 0
80 - 2Q = 0
Q = 40
P = 100 - Q = 100 -40 = 60
Profit = 60*40 - 20*40 = 1,600
b.
Profit1 = (a1/a1+a2) - a1
differentiating wrt a1
dProfit/da1 = a2/(a1+a2)^2* - 1
Putting
dProfit/da1 = a2/(a1+a2)^2* - 1 = 0
a2/(a1+a2)^2* = 1
a2 = (a1+a2)^2/
Similarly
Profit2 = (a2/a1+a2) - a2
differentiating wrt a2
dProfit/da2 = a1/(a1+a2)^2* - 1
Putting
dProfit/da1 = a1/(a1+a2)^2* - 1 = 0
a1/(a1+a2)^2* = 1
a1 = (a1+a2)^2/
so,
a1 = a2 = (a1+a2)^2/
Putting = 1,600
So a1 = a2 = 400
So, Profit of firm1 = /2 - a = 1600/2 - 400 = 400
Profit of firm2 = /2 - a = 1600/2 - 400 = 400
c If neither firm advertises then
Profit of firm1 =Profit of firm2 = /2 = 1600/2 = 800
d.
Yes , firms will chose to advertize in equilibrium , yes that will be a pareto efficient because in that case one can make one firm better off without making other worse off , i.e increasing one firm's profit without reducing other firm profit.
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