a. 15000 b. 22000 c. 15,200 d. 13,800 There for, it_______ socially optimal, or
ID: 1211265 • Letter: A
Question
a. 15000
b. 22000
c. 15,200
d. 13,800
There for, it_______ socially optimal, or efficent, for Felix, Kristen, and Robert to purchase the clock.
a. is
b. is not
If the community (Felix, Kristen, and Robert, in this case) voted on whether to divide up the cost of the clock into equal shares of $7,200 per person,________ of the community would vote for this option.
a. no members
b. three members
c. two members
d. one member
Aplia: Student Quest Chegg Study I Guide × C D courses aplia.com/a servlet/quiz?ctx-jflander 0101 &quiz; action-takeQuiz&quiz; probGuid-Q4PLC0A801010000002f4fd240070000&ck;=3-1462733424867 0AAA690D0 15391 15F98538AB0000 Apps http://kitsunefire https://www.payp * http://www.rinma http://en.savefror S http://dreamdayc https://pro.thalo. http://lazynezumi C http://www.crank https://www.fanfi C college work help t https://www.tum Other bookmarks Public Choice and Special-Interest-Group Politics Graded Assignment | Read Chapter 18 | Back to Assignment Due Thursday 05.12.16 at 11:45 PM Attempts: Average: /3 4. Voting for a public good Felix, Kristen, and Robert are the only inhabitants of the small island of Tock. Unfortunately, the island lacks a means of telling time. However, the inhabitants can import a public clock tower from a neighboring island at a cost of $21,600. Once purchased, nothing could prevent any of the island's inhabitants from using the clock to tell what time it is. The following table shows each individual's benefit from importing the clock tower Individua Benefit from a Clock Felix Kristen Robert $8,200 $6,800 $7,000 The total benefit from the clock to Tock is . Therefore, it socially optimal, or efficient, for Felix, Kristen, and Robert to purchase the clock. If the community (Felix, Kristen, and Robert, in this case) voted on whether to divide up the cost of the clock into equal shares of $7,200 per person, of the community would vote for this option. Kristen tries unsuccessfully to persuade Felix and Robert that the island needs a missile defense system. During their discussion, Kristen and Felix get together and agree to hold two votes rather than one: a vote for a missile defense system and a vote to divide the cost of the clock tower into equal shares. Robert votes "No" on both proposals, but Felix and Kristen each vote "Yes" on both proposals, due to an agreement they made during their earlier discussion to approve both the missile defense system and the clock sequentially. This is an example of Grade It Now Save & Continue Session 58:42 Timeout Copyright Notices Terms of Use Privacy Notice Security NoticeAccessibility 1:53 PM Search the web and Windows 5/8/2016Explanation / Answer
Total benifit =$8200+$6800+$7000=$22000 Therefore, it is socially optimal, or efficent, for Felix, Kristen, and Robert to purchase the clock.
If the community (Felix, Kristen, and Robert, in this case) voted on whether to divide up the cost of the clock into equal shares of $7,200 per person,__one______ of the community would vote for this option.
explanation: Only Felix will vote, because his marginal benifit (8200) is greater than the marginal cost (7200).
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