Mackie considers the argument that some \"second-order\" goods emerge out of evi

Question

Mackie considers the argument that some "second-order" goods emerge out of evil and so require it. Which of the following is NOT one of his replies to that argument?

Question 4 options:

Second-order goods are small, unimportant goods, so they don't outweigh evil.

Second-order goods would also bring second-order evils, which a good and omnipotent God would eliminate.

Some second-order goods, such as benevolence, are only valuable as a means to happiness, so they are not a justification for evil.

Second-order goods are small, unimportant goods, so they don't outweigh evil.

Second-order goods would also bring second-order evils, which a good and omnipotent God would eliminate.

Some second-order goods, such as benevolence, are only valuable as a means to happiness, so they are not a justification for evil.

Explanation / Answer

3. Some second-order goods, such as benevolence, are only valuable as a means to happiness, so they are not a justification for evil.  

The above statement is not in accordance with Mackie's argument about Second-order goods. He claimed that second-order goods like Benevolence try to maximise first-order good and minimise first order evil. These second order goods are not only valuable as means to happiness.

3. Some second-order goods, such as benevolence, are only valuable as a means to happiness, so they are not a justification for evil.  

The above statement is not in accordance with Mackie's argument about Second-order goods. He claimed that second-order goods like Benevolence try to maximise first-order good and minimise first order evil. These second order goods are not only valuable as means to happiness.

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