i want to answer those 2 question in your way and see some answer Do you agree w
ID: 3492063 • Letter: I
Question
i want to answer those 2 question in your way and see some answer
Do you agree with Gaunilo's criticism on the ontological argument?
Is the concept of a maximally great being coherent?
example
I do agree with Gaunilo's view as he suggests an explanation for the questionable argument of the Anselm's. Gaunilo ultimately challenges the Anselm notion that god exists in the mind by stating that that the being which no greater can be conceived cannot be merely verbal. Gaunilo suggests that God must not only exist in the mind but must exist in reality also. An island cannot be thought of, but must also be existing in reality.
It is a conceptual truth that a piland is an island than which none greater can be imagined (that is, the greatest possible island that can be imagined). (IEP)
Notice, however, that premise 1 of Gaunilo's argument is incoherent. The problem here is that the qualities that make an island great are not the sort of qualities that admit of conceptually maximal qualities. (IEP)
The general point here, then, is this: Anselm's argument works, if at all, only for concepts that are entirely defined in terms of properties that admit of some sort of intrinsic maximum. As C.D. Broad puts this important point: (IEP)
Simplicity - The doctrine of simplicity states that each of God's real or intrinsic properties is identical with his other real or intrinsic properties, and with his being or nature. (SEP)
Therefore, if God’s intrinsic properties are self-limiting, they have an intrinsic maximum. What is more is that the maximum is intrinsic to the nature of God. Therefore, to imagine the maximum, you are thereby imagining God. Anything other that you imagine would not be God, and as such would be inferior.
Simplicity is the same argument used to treat the relationship between the knower and what is known. God is exempt from being caused by the world because, unlike regular cases of knowing, where knowing alters the knower, God is Immutable and thus it follows that God’s knowledge of the world is an intrinsic property of God’s Omnipotence, which in turn, due to simplicity, is caused and limited and defined by God’s other properties.
What is a good reference for arguments about God’s simplicity? I realized that the SEP article referenced Hinduism often with regards to sectarian divides between conceptions of a metaphysically singular God and a theistic God comprised of or possessing maximally great properties, however the justification for the latter, which in turn is the justification for simplicity that is not ultimate was rather confusing.
I think the major issue behind all these problems is grasping the concept of simplicity better, because simplicity is necessary for a defense of the ontological argument.
I think that the best is ambiguous here. I think St. Anselm meant that God had the most being imaginable. For his proof, he wasn't so interested in God's greatness in a moral or axiological sense. His idea of God as having the most being imaginable makes sense if one accepts Anselm's Platonist ontology. In Platonism, there is a hierarchy of being, ranging from the relative being of the sensible world to the immutable being of the forms, to the being of God/the One, which is infinite, transcendent being itself and from which all else derives its being and nature.
Explanation / Answer
Do you agree with Gaunilo's criticism on the ontological argument?
I do agree with Gaunilo's view as he suggests an explanation for the questionable argument of the Anselm's. Gaunilo ultimately challenges the Anselm notion that god exists in the mind by stating that that the being which no greater can be conceived cannot be merely verbal.
Gaunilo suggests that God must not only exist in the mind but must exist in reality also. An island cannot be thought of, but must also be existing in reality.
It is a conceptual truth that a piland is an island than which none greater can be imagined (that is, the greatest possible island that can be imagined). (IEP)
Notice, however, that premise 1 of Gaunilo's argument is incoherent.
The problem here is that the qualities that make an island great are not the sort of qualities that admit of conceptually maximal qualities. (IEP)
The general point here, then, is this: Anselm's argument works, if at all, only for concepts that are entirely defined in terms of properties that admit of some sort of intrinsic maximum. As C.D. Broad puts this important point: (IEP)
Simplicity - The doctrine of simplicity states that each of God's real or intrinsic properties is identical with his other real or intrinsic properties, and with his being or nature. (SEP)
Therefore, if God’s intrinsic properties are self-limiting, they have an intrinsic maximum. What is more is that the maximum is intrinsic to the nature of God.
Therefore, to imagine the maximum, you are thereby imagining God. Anything other that you imagine would not be God, and as such would be inferior.
Simplicity is the same argument used to treat the relationship between the knower and what is known. God is exempt from being caused by the world because, unlike regular cases of knowing, where knowing alters the knower, God is Immutable and thus it follows that God’s knowledge of the world is an intrinsic property of God’s Omnipotence, which in turn, due to simplicity, is caused and limited and defined by God’s other properties.
What is a good reference for arguments about God’s simplicity?
I realized that the SEP article referenced Hinduism often with regards to sectarian divides between conceptions of a metaphysically singular God and a theistic God comprised of or possessing maximally great properties, however the justification for the latter, which in turn is the justification for simplicity that is not ultimate was rather confusing.
I think the major issue behind all these problems is grasping the concept of simplicity better, because simplicity is necessary for a defense of the ontological argument.
I think that the best is ambiguous here. I think St. Anselm meant that God had the most being imaginable. For his proof, he wasn't so interested in God's greatness in a moral or axiological sense.
His idea of God as having the most being imaginable makes sense if one accepts Anselm's Platonist ontology.
In Platonism, there is a hierarchy of being, ranging from the relative being of the sensible world to the immutable being of the forms, to the being of God/the One, which is infinite, transcendent being itself and from which all else derives its being and nature.
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