The Digital Divide - Benjamin Compaine (2001) suggests that the phrase digital d

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The Digital Divide -

Benjamin Compaine (2001) suggests that the phrase

digital divide is basically a new label for an earlier expression used to describe the

“information haves and have-nots.” He defines the digital divide as the gap, or

“perceived gap,” between those who have and do not have access to “information

tools” and between those who have and do not have the ability to use those tools. So, in

Compaine’s view, merely having access to cybertechnology is not sufficient; one must also

possess the knowledge and ability to use that technology.

First, we should note that an analysis of the digital divide might suggest that there is

one overall divide—that is, a single divide as opposed to many “divides,” or divisions.

Actually, there are multiple divisions involving access to cybertechnology. Keiron

O’Hara and David Stevens (2006) note that there are divides involving rich and poor

people, rich and poor regions, and rich and poor nations. For our purposes, however,

issues affecting the digital divide can be organized into two broad categories: a divide

between nations and a divide within nations.1 The division between information-rich and

information-poor nations is sometimes referred to as the “global digital divide”; the

technological divides within nations, on the contrary, exist between rich and poor

persons, racial majority and minority groups, men and women, and so forth.

The global digital divide-In 2000, it was estimated that

361 million people, approximately 5.8% of the world’s population, were online; the vast

majority of those users lived in North America and Europe.2 Since then, global Internet

usage has expanded significantly (nearly eightfold). In March 2011, it was estimated that

there were slightly more than two billion Internet users.3 A significant shift had already

occurred by 2005, when the list of countries or regions where more than 50% of the

population used the Internet had grown to 30.4 That year, seven nations—Australia,

Canada, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and the United States—had

an Internet penetration rate of higher than 60%.

As of 2011, the disparity between the percentage of Internet users in developed and

developing countries continues to be significant. In India, for example, the penetration rate for Internet users is 8.4%, while in the United Kingdom it is 82%.5 The disparity is

especially apparent when viewed from the perspective of continents or world regions. For

example, in Africa (which includes approximately 15% of the world’s population) the

Internet penetration rate is 11.4%, whereas in North America, the Internet penetration

rate is 78.3% (as of March 2011). On a positive note, however, the Internet usage growth

in Africa was 2,527.4% between 2000 and 2011.6 William Wresch (2009) notes that in a

33-month period during those years there was a 60% growth in the number of African

Web sites. So, one might be encouraged by some reports describing the growth in

Internet usage at the global level.

One obstacle to eliminating the global digital divide altogether is that developing

countries struggle with low literacy rates; many people in developing nations cannot read

and write in their native language, let alone in English. And, much of the material on the

Internet is in English. This has influenced advocates for improved Internet service for

global users to lobby for the development of Web applications that include more graphics

and images that can serve as universal symbols.

The digital divide within nations-Many developed nations still have significant divides within them regarding access to

cybertechnology. For example, O’Hara and Stevens point to one such discrepancy in

the United Kingdom. They note that in 2004, approximately one half of all households

were online, while only 3% of the poorest households were included in this number. As

one might expect, there are also significant disparities within some developing nations as

well. And in rapidly developing countries like India, the divisions that currently exist may

eventually deepen. Consider that a growing segment of India’s population is fluent in

English and has the technical literacy required to work on many of the highly-skilled jobs

outsourced there; those on the other side of the divide, comprising the majority of the

population of India, tend to have a low level of literacy and little or no access to

cybertechnology. Unlike universal service policies involving telephones,

which are aimed at subsidizing residential telephone service, E-rates for Internet access

apply only to “community points of access” such as public libraries. While E-rates may

support universal Internet access, they do not provide universal Internet service. So,

critics such as Chapman and Rotenberg (1995) have argued that merely providing

community points of access to the Internet would be similar to a policy that simply

placed telephones in public locations rather than making telephone service affordable for

all Americans.

Some critics worry that the absence of a (universal) Internet service policy in the

United States could adversely affect school-age children in low-income families. Consider

the following scenario, where someone tries to convince you that an Internet service

policy is needed to level the playing field for economically disadvantaged students

attending U.S. public schools.

Is digital divide an ethical issue- The authors note that while there has been much enthusiasm about the emergence of

new technologies, there is also concern over “the uneven distribution of the new

information wealth, both within nations and internationally.”9 To argue that the unequal

distribution of information wealth is a moral issue would require that we show that

information is a kind of “primary good” that is vital for human flourishing. So, we need to

consider whether information meets the criteria of a kind of good or resource that is vital

for one’s well-being. Additionally, if we can show that not having access to cybertechnology

either denies or unfairly limits access to information or to certain kinds of basic

goods—what James Moor (2004) calls “core goods” (or “core values”), such as knowledge,

ability, freedom, and so forth—then we can make a fairly strong case that unequal

access to cybertechnology is a moral issue affecting distributive justice. Theory of Justice, philosopher John Rawls introduces the

notion of primary social goods, which are resources that satisfy basic human needs and

thus have a special value or moral weight in society. Rawls notes that with these goods,

humans “can generally be assured of greater success in carrying out their intentions and

in advancing their needs.”10 Van den Hoven and Rooksby argue that Rawls’ theory of

justice in general, and his notion of a primary social good in particular, can be extended to

include “information goods.” They further argue, however that a “fully-fledged theory of

justice that takes adequate account of the new information goods . . . is still some way

off.”11 But we can nonetheless examine some models that have been advanced for

showiOne model has been articulated by Jeremy Moss (2002), who argues that persons

lacking access to cybertechnology are deprived of resources that are vital for theirng why the digital divide is indeed a moral issue affecting distributive justice.

He points out that without access to cybertechnology, people are unfairly

disadvantaged because their

1. access to knowledge is significantly lessened or prevented,

2. ability to participate fully in the political decision-making process and to receive

important information is greatly diminished, and

3. economic prospects are severely hindered.12

First, Moss claims that people who are deprived of access to cybertechnology are not

able to benefit from the increasing range of information available on the Internet and

thus are falling further behind in the information era. Second, because of political barriers

to participation in the decision-making processes in developing countries, people in

remote areas without access to the Internet may have no means at all of participating in

national debates or of receiving information about important developmental matters and

policies that can significantly affect them. Third, Moss believes that because so much

economic growth is driven by the information and communication sector, people living in

countries that are not part of this sector are disadvantaged

In response to Moss and Norris, one could argue that some people (and some

nations) have always been disadvantaged in accessing new technologies such as automobiles,

household appliances, and so forth. But this criticism misses a crucial point. As

we have noted, disparities in access to certain technologies, such as Mercedes-Benz

automobiles, do not in themselves constitute an ethical issue. We should also note that

divisions of this type are generally accepted in capitalist societies. However, if Moss’s

thesis about why cybertechnology is important is correct, then having access to cybertechnology

is essential for one’s well-being in ways that having access to other kinds of

technologies—for example, “discretionary technologies” that provide convenience and

entertainment—is not.

Cybertechnology and the disabled- Not only do equity-and-access issues involving cybertechnology affect poor people in

developing nations and people in low-income groups within developed nations, they also

affect many disabled people. So, some suggest that core equity-and-access issues underlying

the digital divide apply to this group of people as well. There has been much

discussion about implementing strategies and policies to make the Internet more. WAI representatives have worked with industry groups and governmental organizations

to establish guidelines for the design of “user agents,” which are intended to lower

barriers to Web accessibility for people with disabilities. These user agents include Web

browsers and other types of software that retrieve and render Web content; the agents

are designed to conform and communicate with other technologies, especially “assistive

technologies” such as screen readers (which perform a function similar to Braille

applications in offline contexts). Frances Grodzinsky (2000) argues that computers

equipped with assistive technologies and “adaptive devices” can be “equalizers” in

the era of information technology because they enable people with disabilities to

participate in and compete for jobs that require computer access.

Disabled persons and remote work -One controversial question has centered on whether the practice of “remote work”—

made possible by technology that enables employees to work outside the traditional

workplace, typically in their homes—has benefited or harmed disabled persons. Fairweather worries that a company’s remote work policies might provide employers

with a convenient scheme for keeping disabled workers out of the physical workplace. He

finds this troubling for three reasons: First, it affects worker autonomy because it denies

those disabled workers who could work either remotely or in a conventional workplace

setting the choice of determining where they will work.

Arguments for continued WAI support-WAI proponents such as Cheiko Asakawa

(2012) argue that access to technology is not simply a privilege but rather a “human

right.” Other WAI supporters, however, take a different tack in pressing their case for

why initiatives for the disabled should continue to be supported. For example, they point

out that some measures taken for the disabled have had positive outcomes for other

groups, especially poor people who are often forced to deal with literacy problems and

inadequate equipment. (Recall our earlier discussion of literacy problems in developing

nations in Section 10.1.1.) It may well turn out that voice-recognition technology

designed to assist disabled persons who are unable to use keyboards will ultimately

also benefit nondisabled persons with low literacy skills. So we see that larger groups of

(non-disabled) people have benefited and could continue to benefit from some Webbased

initiatives designed for disabled persons, even though the resulting positive effects

in the past may have been unanticipated and unintended.

Because improving access to cybertechnology for the disabled has potential benefits

for society as a whole, we can formulate a utilitarian argument to advance this cause.

However, we should also be cautious about extending this argument too far. What would

happen if, in the future, the broader population did not realize any benefits from

improving access to cybertechnology for the disabled? Could this kind of outcome

lend support to a utilitarian argument against investing in initiatives that improved access

for the disabled? After considering this, you can better understand some of the possible

dangers of relying too heavily on utilitarian principles when advancing a moral argument

for improved access for the disabled.

Cybertechnology and race-United States many lower-income individuals and families,

especially those in the inner cities, still do not have in-home access to the Internet;

many of these individuals also belong to racial and ethnic minority groups. Consider

statistics ranging from 2000 to 2011 that correlate income (social class) and race with

the digital divide in the United States. In 2000, 51% of all homes had at least

one computer, and 41.5% of all homes had Internet access. In terms of income,

86.3% of households earning more than $75,000 per year had Internet access, while of

those households earning below $15,000 per year, only 12.7% had access. From the

vantage point of race, 46.1% of white Americans and 56.8% of Asian Americans and

Pacific Islanders had access, contrasted with only 23.5% of African Americans and

23.1% of Hispanics who did.17

By 2008, 73% of adult men and women in the United States had Internet access at

home, while 90% of young people between the ages of 18 and 29 used the Internet.

However, the penetration rate for black Internet users in the United States then was

59%, which was still well below the penetration for the American population as a

whole.18

As of 2011, however, statistics for African American vs. white users has changed

significantly. Whereas Internet usage among whites was estimated to be 88%, the rate of

African Americans using the Internet had grown to 80%. Perhaps even more interesting

was the rate at which the use of access to broadband Internet connection had grown for

African Americans. Whereas 65% of African American Internet users had broadband

access, only 53% of white American Internet users enjoyed this service; nearly half of

these users had not migrated from earlier forms of Internet access such as dial-up

technologies.19

Internet usage patterns-Studies conducted a decade or so ago reported that African Americans who used the

Internet differed from their white counterparts in two key respects: usage patterns and

demographic characteristics. Kretchmer and Karveth

(2001) described four ways in which African Americans and whites differed. First,

African American users were more likely to use the Internet for entertainment and

for locating information about quality of life activities, such as job training, school, health

care, and hobbies. Second, they were less likely to participate in Web-based auctions.

Third, they were also less likely to feel that the Internet connects them with family and

friends. Fourth, they were less likely to use e-mail to develop and sustain friendships.

Kretchmer and Karveth also cited relevant sociodemographic differences between

African Americans and whites: the average age for African American users tended

to be younger than for whites, African Americans typically accessed the Internet less

frequently than whites, and adult African American Internet users were much more

likely than their white counterparts to have modest incomes, no college degrees, and

children under eighteen.

Racism and the internet-Kretchmer and Karveth note that the study of race in

cyberspace often leads to paradoxical inferences. On the one hand, cyberspace

provides an opportunity and forum to discover and confront racial issues, but on

the other hand, it can perpetuate, or perhaps even enhance, aspects of racism. For

example, the Internet has introduced new tools for harassing members of certain

groups. Thus Internet technology can be, and has been, used to magnify the rhetoric

and significance of hate groups.

Lynn Theismeyer (1999) has pointed out the “rhetorical role” that the Internet

can play with respect to race. She examines the rhetoric of racism, not as it applies

specifically to racial and minority groups in the United States, such as African Americans

and Hispanics, but rather as it has been used internationally in the rise of neo-Nazi

propaganda. Theismeyer believes that there are two kinds of racist speech on the

Internet:

a. Hate speech, including text, music, online radio broadcasts, and images that

exhort users to act against target groups.

b. Persuasive rhetoric that does not directly enunciate but ultimately promotes or

justifies violence.20

Cybertechnology and gender-Other equity-and-access concerns associated with cybertechnology in general, and with

the digital divide in particular, can be analyzed with respect to gender. Feminist authors

and others who advocate for women’s issues proffer arguments similar to those advanced

by or on behalf of African Americans, which we examined in the preceding section.

Women, like certain racial and ethnic groups, have not always been included in important

decisions about technology policies and, until very recently, have not participated to the

same degree as men in the use of cybertechnology. Although the gap between female and male Internet users has narrowed considerably

in the United States and in many Western countries, this has not been the case

globally. Leslie Regan Shade (2002) has described how many women in the Philippines,

Latin America, Africa, and Asia have developed “grass-roots” initiatives, which she

refers to as “globalizing from below” to address the technology gap. She also notes

that at the second Global Knowledge Conference, held in Malaysia in 2000, specific

initiatives were introduced to support gender equity and women’s empowerment using

cybertechnology.

Access to high technology jobs-Some see the root of the gender-and-technology problem, at least as it applies to access

issues involving jobs in computer science and engineering, in educational practices that

contribute to the overall socialization process for women. For example, many social

scientists point out that at an early age girls learn that science (and, by association,

technology) is for boys; computers reinforce certain stereotypes regarding technology

and gender. Many critics concede that girls and young women have not literally been

denied access to careers in computing, but they point out that socialization—for example,

processes that encourage males and females to adopt particular gender-based roles—has

perpetuated the gender imbalance.

Kirlidog, Aykol, and Gulsecen (2009) cite more recent evidence to support the

ongoing concerns about the “pipeline,” and they argue that computer science is still

typically regarded as a “male profession,” both in industry and academia. They also believe

that women remain in the “margins” of a male-dominated profession, which is filled with

highly gendered expressions such as “killing or aborting programs,” “workbench, ”

“toolkit, ” etc., that reflect the masculine culture of the field. The authors identify three

“net results” of the male-dominated computing profession in which women

1. are underrepresented in computer-related jobs,

2. are more underrepresented in the managerial ranks in the computing field

because of the “glass ceiling,”

3. earn less than men for doing the same jobs.23

De Palma suggests that if computer science programs (in colleges and universities)

were more like mathematics programs than they currently are, then perhaps more

women would be attracted to them. He also notes that much of the high-tech culture

associated with the early days of computing was dominated by males, who tended to be

fascinated with gadgetry and devices, as opposed to mathematics per se. This, in turn,

affected how programming courses were conceived of and taught. De Palma speculates

that if course instruction on how to program were designed to be as close as possible to

pure logic, as opposed to “reliance on glitzy software packages and fancy graphical user

interfaces,” women might find programming courses and computer science programs

more attractive. Although this explanation is based on speculation, as De Palma admits, it

would be an interesting hypothesis to test.

While it may be difficult to provide a convincing and uncontroversial explanation as

to why relatively few women have pursued careers in computer science, we clearly need

to consider some implications that this continued trend could have for the future of the

computing field. We should note that in addition to providing information used in

projecting the number of women who will have access to jobs in the computer profession,

analyses of “pipeline statistics” also provide us with projections regarding the proportion

of women who will have access to important decision-making roles in the computing and

high-tech industries. Because the decisions that women make could significantly impact

future directions in cybertechnology development, it would seem that carefully monitoring

statistics and trends affecting the “pipeline” is warranted.

Gender bias in software designs and video games-educational software tended to favor male

learning behaviors and thus was biased against female learners. So, there was some

concern then about the effect that gender bias in educational software programs might

have for young female students. Although concerns about this kind of gender bias have

dissipated in recent years, critics argue that gender bias can still be found in many other

kinds of software applications. This is especially apparent in the case of video game

software. Elizabeth Buchanan (2000) argues that this bias raises two distinct kinds of

ethical concerns, because video games tend to: (1) either misrepresent or exclude female

characters, and (2) perpetuate traditional sexist stereotypes. With respect to (1), she

argues that the representational politics of gender in video games needs greater

evaluation, because many computer games, especially virtual sports games, include

no female characters at all. And with respect to (2), Buchanan argues that video games

such as Barbie Fashion Designer have reinforced traditional cultural stereotypes along

gender lines.

Some might tend to dismiss concerns about gender bias in video games on the

grounds that many women simply aren’t interested in them. However, Philip Brey (2008)

argues that the question of gender bias in these games is “morally significant.” He points

out, for example, that if

computer games tend to be designed and marketed for men, then women are at an unfair

advantage, as they consequently have less opportunity to enjoy computer games and their

possible benefits. Among such benefits may be greater computer literacy, an important quality

in today’s market place.

CYBERTECHNOLOGY, DEMOCRACY,

AND DEMOCRATIC IDEALS-A number of interesting questions arise at the intersection of democracy and cybertechnology.

For example, some authors question whether the Internet is an inherently

democratic technology, while others question whether we should develop the Internet

along democratic principles (Johnson 2000).27 In our analysis of democracy and

cybertechnology, however, we consider two slightly different kinds of questions:

1. Has the use of cybertechnology so far enhanced democracy and democratic

ideals, or has it threatened them?

2. What impact has cybertechnology had so far on the political-election process in

democratic nations?

Has Cybertechnology Enhanced or Threatened Democracy?

Why should we care whether cybertechnology favors and possibly enhances democracy,

or whether it instead threatens and potentially undermines it? We can begin by noting

that democracy, when compared to alternative forms of government, seems an attractive

political structure and, arguably, one of the fairest. Because of these assumptions,

Gordon Graham (1999) points out that it is difficult to get people, especially in the

Western world, to engage in a serious debate about the merits of democracy. He correctly

notes that democracy, along with its corresponding notion of a “democratic ideal,” has

won almost universal and largely unquestioning acceptance in the West. Graham also

points out, however, that political theorists and philosophers have not always regarded

democracy as the best—or, in some cases, not even as an adequate—form of government.

For example, in The Republic, Plato was highly critical of democracy and viewed it as a

form of mob rule in which important decisions could be made by a citizenry that typically

was not well informed on matters involving the state. And in the nineteenth century,

philosopher John Stuart Mill also questioned whether democracy was the ideal form of

government.2

Values affecting openness, empowerment, choice, and greater access to information

all seem to favor democracy. Thus, in so far as cybertechnology facilitates these values, it

would also seem to favor democracy and democratic ideals. But does the Internet’s

“open” architecture necessarily facilitate democratic values universally? Consider that

some countries have gone to great lengths to censor political speech in cyberspace. For

example, China required Google to comply with strict rules for filtering information,

which many nations in the West would view as unacceptable. Also, Saudi Arabia has

censored political speech online. So, nondemocratic countries have found some ways

around the “open” architecture of the Internet and its ability to spread information

freely.

In suggesting that online search technologies may threaten democratic ideals,

Introna and Nissenbaum point out that search engines “systematically exclude certain

sites and certain types of sites, in favor of others”—a practice that they believe privileges

some groups and some persons at the expense of others. Diaz (2008) raises a related

concern when he asks whether Internet search technologies will filter out, and thus

exclude, the kinds of “independent voices and diverse viewpoints” that are essential for

a democracy.

Graham worries that some features of the Internet may contribute to the “worst

aspects” of democracy by fostering social and political fragmentation. And Eli Pariser

(2011) believes that a new mode of filtering on the Internet, involving “personalization

filters” that are now used by major search engines, threatens democracy. Next, we briefly

consider each type of threat.

SHow does the Internet facilitate social and political fragmentation, and why is fragmentation

problematic for a democratic society? The Internet fragments society by facilitating

the formation of groups who depart from the mainstream perspectives of a cohesive

society. An analogy involving television news programming in physical space might help

us appreciate how easily social and political fragmentation can occur and why it can be

problematic. Consider that until the advent of cable TV news programming in the 1970s,

American television viewers relied primarily on the three major networks for the evening

news reports. Even though the program formats varied slightly and even though different

anchors delivered the news to viewers, all three presented “mainstream” news reporting

that satisfied certain standards of accuracy and credibility before the networks would

broadcast it. At times, the members of political groups may have been annoyed with, or

possibly even offended by, the way that a particular story was presented, but the news

reports were generally descriptive, or factual. Some news programs also included

commentaries, usually toward the end of the program, in which the commentator

expressed an opinion, but there was a clear line between “factual” reporting and

pWe can apply a similar analogy to news reports of domestic political issues in the

United States. Conservatives and liberals can each interact in online forums and visit

Web sites that exclusively promote the political views that they embrace. Of course, a

critic could point out that prior to the Internet, many people subscribed to newspapers

and magazines that were labeled as either radically liberal or radically conservative and

therefore biased in their reporting. But it is more difficult to filter information in physical

space because people in most physical communities encounter individuals with ideological

perspectives different from their own, even when they seek out only those who share

their belief systems. In online forums, however, it is possible for individuals to be in

contact with only those people who share their ideological beliefs. Thus Richard Epstein

(2000) worries that in the near future, the concept of the “public square,” where ideas

have been traditionally debated, could become fragmented into “thousands of highly

specialized communities that do not communicate with one another.”ersonal opinionocial/Political Fragmentation and “Personalization” Filters

How has Cybertechnology Affected Political Elections in Democratic Nations?

Electronic Devices and Social Media

Graham suggests that in representative democracies, such as the United States, cybertechnology

might be used to concentrate more power in the hands of elected representatives

instead of ordinary citizens. He also notes that many representatives and

political leaders (including their staffs) tend to have both greater technological resources

and the ability to use them more skillfully than many ordinary citizens. These factors, in

Graham’s view, suggest that those in power can effectively use these technological

resources to retain their power. We can ask whether the following example illustrates

Graham’s point. In the 2004 U.S. presidential elections, Carl Rove, a member of the

George W. Bush administration, used BlackBerry (smart phone) technology to coordinate

with Republican officials across all of the voting precincts in Ohio, a “battleground

state” that would determine the winner of that year’s election. Some political commentators

suggested that Rove’s coordinating a state-wide, get-out-the-vote effort to target

voters via the use of BlackBerry technology helped to ensure victory in Ohio, which

provided the necessary electoral votes for President Bush to remain in power for four

more years. Although it is difficult to prove that Rove’s use of this technology helped the

incumbent president to remain in power in 2004, we can see how the use of the latest

technology in a state or national election can influence the voter turnout and ultimately

the outcome of that election.

Next, consider that as Barack Obama prepared to run in the 2008 U.S. presidential

elections, his staff organized a “grassroots” fund-raising strategy on the Internet through

various social networking sites (SNSs) to raise millions of dollars (mostly as small

contributions from young people) to finance his presidential campaign. (We examine

SNSs in detail in Chapter 11.) Now that Obama is in office and running for a second term,

it will also be interesting to see whether his 2012 presidential reelection campaign once

again takes advantage of the latest social-media technologies to win reelection and

remain in power for four additional years.

Job Displacement and the Transformed Workplace

While it is debatable whether cybertechnology has benefited workers, overall, it is quite

clear that this technology has significantly changed the workplace. Some have gone so far

as to suggest that cybertechnology has transformed the nature of work itself. One

question that frequently arises in discussions about the transformation of employment

by cybertechnology is whether, on balance, it has created or eliminated more jobs. There

are arguments to support both sides of this debate. Although cybertechnology has caused

certain industries to eliminate human jobs, it has enabled other industries, such as

computer support companies, to create jobs; social scientists often refer to this shift as job

displacement. We examine some key issues involving job displacement from two broad

perspectives or categories:

A. automation, robotics, and expert systems;

B. remote work, outsourcing, and globalization.

Automation, Robotics, and Expert Systems

Job displacement is often associated with automation. Social and ethical issues involving

automation are by no means new, nor are they unique to cybertechnology. Social

scientists note that the Industrial Revolution transformed jobs into smaller, discrete

tasks that could be automated by machines, creating working conditions that adversely

affected the lives of many workers. When new automated technology threatened to

replace many workers, one group of disenchanted workers in England—later referred to

as “Luddites”—smashed machines used to make textiles. (“Luddite” is derived from a

nineteenth-century British worker, Ned Ludd, who reputedly led workers in destroying

factory machinery.)

Developments in robotics have also raised social concerns affecting job displacement.

Robots, equipped with motor abilities that enable them to manipulate objects, can

be programmed to perform tasks that are either (a) routine and mundane for humans, or

(b) considered hazardous to humans. As Patrick Lin (2012) so aptly puts it, robots are

typically tasked to perform the “three Ds”—i.e., jobs that humans consider “dull, dirty,

and dangerous.” Although robots were once fairly unsophisticated, contemporary

robotic systems are able to perform a wide range of tasks

Remote Work, Job Outsourcing, and Globalization

One factor that has transformed work for many employees is that cybertechnology has

made it possible for them to work “remotely”—i.e., outside the traditional workplace.

Even though remote work, referred to by some as “telework,” is a relatively recent

practice, it has already raised social and ethical questions. One question has to do

with whether all employees who perform remote work benefit from it equally

Ironically, perhaps, the jobs of the programmers who had the high-tech skills needed

to make the outsourcing of many white-collar jobs a reality are now being outsourced

to countries where programmers earn less money. Baker and Kripalani (2005) point

out that the career prospects of American software programmers, which were “once

dazzling,” are now in doubt. In fact, the authors note that, because of this trend, the future

of high-tech economy in the United States may also be at risk. Although it is still too

soon to say with any confidence what the net effect of the outsourcing of programming

jobs will mean, it raises concerns that warrant serious consideration.

Employee Stress, Workplace Surveillance, and Computer Monitoring

Many workers experience stress because their activities are now monitored closely by an

“invisible supervisor”— i.e., the computer, which can record information about one’s

work habits. The 2007 Electronic Monitoring and Surveillance Report, sponsored by the

American Management Association (AMA) and published by the AMA/e Policy

Institute Research (2008), noted that 43% of American companies monitor employee

e-mail, and 96% of those companies “track external (incoming and outgoing messages).”

The report also noted that 45% of companies track the amount of time an employee

spends at the keyboard. An increasing number of these companies now also monitor the

blogosphere (described in Chapter 11) to see what is being written about them in various

blogs, and some also monitor social networking sites such as Facebook. As a result

of increased monitoring, many employees have been fired for misusing a company’s

e-mail resources or its Web resources, or both. So, the threats posed by computerized

monitoring would clearly seem to contribute to employee stress.

Distinguishing Between Two Different Aspects of Employee Monitoring

Weckert (2005) argues that it is crucial to draw some distinctions involving two areas of

computerized monitoring: (1) the different applications of monitoring, and (2) the

different kinds of work situations (that are monitored).

Regarding (1), Weckert notes that employees could be monitored with respect to the

following kinds of activities:

_ e-mail usage,

_ URLs visited while Web surfing,

_ quality of their work,

_ speed of their work,

_ work practices (health and safety),

_ employee interaction.

He points out that the reasons given to justify the application of monitoring in activities

involving employee e-mail and Internet use may be very different from the kinds of

justificationsneededtomonitoranemployee’sspeedofworkorthequalityofhisorherwork.

With regard to (2), some further distinctions also need to be made concerning which

kinds of workers should be monitored. Weckert notes that while it may be appropriate to

monitor the keystrokes of data entry workers to measure their performance in specific

periods of time, it may not be appropriate to monitor the e-mail of workers in cases where

client confidentially is expected. For example, he points out that a therapist employed in a

health organization may receive highly sensitive and personal e-mail from one of her

client’s regarding the client’s mental state or physical health

Some Rationales for and Against Workplace Monitoring

As in the case of many controversies involving the use of cybertechnology, employee

monitoring demonstrates a clash of legitimate interests and rights for the parties involved.

Rationales Used to Support and to Oppose Employee Monitoring

Rationales Used Support to Monitoring Rationales Used to Oppose Monitoring

Improves worker productivity Increases employee stress

Improves corporate profits Invades employee privacy

Guards against industrial espionage Reduces employee autonomy

Reduces employee theft Undermines employee trust

Opponents of monitoring have a very different perspective: Some see computer

monitoring as a Big Brother tactic or as an “electronic whip” used unfairly by management,

and they believe it creates a work environment tantamount to an “electronic

sweatshop.” Some believe that managers are motivated to use monitoring because they

distrust their employees. Others claim that monitoring invades individual privacy, and

thus disregards human rights. Along these lines, Rooksby and Cica (2005) argue that

monitoring also poses a threat to an individual’s right to “psychological autonomy.”

Some critics also charge that while monitoring may accurately measure the quantity of

work an employee produces, it fails to measure the overall quality of that work. Others

argue that computer monitoring is ultimately counterproductive, because of its effects on

employee morale. Table 10.1 lists some typical rationales used on both sides of the debate.

In concluding our discussion of employee monitoring, we should note that there are

additional aspects of this controversy that we have not considered in this chapter. For

example, there are now many global and international dimensions to workplace monitoring,

which raise controversial questions. Stephen Coleman (2005) points out that in

the global workforce, a person’s privacy could be violated by software monitoring

programs that reside on a computer located in a country different from where that

individual is working. This raises concerns about whether international agreements for

employee monitoring policies may be needed. In fact, Coleman suggests that an

International Bill of Human Rights be adopted in response to concerns affecting global

aspects of the employee monitoring. Unfortunately, an examination of this aspect of

monitoring, as well as Coleman’s proposed solution, is beyond the scope of this chapter.

Please write summary of this chapter

Explanation / Answer

we can formulate a utilitarian argument to advance this cause.