Case Study: Disney in France Until 1992, the Walt Disney Company had experienced
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Case Study: Disney in France Until 1992, the Walt Disney Company had experienced nothing but success in the theme park business. Its first park, Disneyland, opened in Anaheim, California, in 1955. Its theme song, "It's a Small World A fter All, promoted "an idealized vision of America spiced with reassuring glimpses of exotic cultures all calculated to promote heartwarming feelings about living together as one happy family. There were dark tunnels and rides to scare the children a little but none of the terrors of the real world...The Disney characters that cartoons and comic books were on hand to shepherd the guests and to direct them to the Mickey Mouse watches and Little Mermaid records. The Anaheim park was an instant succe ss In the 1970s, the triumph was repeated in Florida, and in 1983, Disney proved the Japanese also have an affinity for Mickey Mouse with the successful opening of Tokyo Disneyland. Having wooed the Japanese, Disney executives in 1986 turned their attention to France and, more specifically, to Paris, the self-proclaimed capital of European high culture and style. "Why did they pick France?" many asked. When word first got out that Disney wanted to build another international theme park, officials from more than 200 locations all over the world descended on Disney with pleas and cash inducements to work the Disney magic in their hometowns. But Paris was chosen because of demographics and subsidies. About 17 million Europeans live less than a two-hour drive from Paris. Another 310 million can fly there in the same time or less. Also, the French government was so eager sney that it offered the company more than S1 billion in various incentives, all in the expectation that the project would create 30,000 French jobs. From the beginning, cultural gaffes by Disney set the tone for the project. By late 1986, Disney was deep in negotiations with the French government. To the exasperation of the Disney team, headed by Joe Shapiro, the talks were taking far longer than expected. Jean-Rene Bemard, the chief French negotiator, said he was astonished when Mr. Shapiro, his patience depleted, ran to the door of the room and, in a very un-Gallic gesture began kicking it repeatedly, shouting, "Get me something to break!" There was also snipping from Parisian intellectuals who attacked the transplantation of Disney's dream world as an assault on French culture; "a cultural Chemobyl," one prominent intellectual called it. The minister of culture announced he would boycott the opening, proclaiming it to be an unwelcome symbol of American elichés and a consumer society. Unperturbed, Disney pushed ahead with the planned summer 1992 opening of the S5 billion park. Shortly afer Euro-Disneyland opened, French farmers drove their tractors to the entrance and blocked it This globally televised act of protest was aimed not at Disney but at the US government, which had been demanding that French agricultural subsidies be cut. Still, it focused world attention upon the loveless marria of Disney and Paris. Then there were the operational errors. Disncy's policy of serving no alcohol in the park, since reversed caused in a country where a glass of wine for lunch is a given. Disney thought that Monday would be light day for visitors and Friday a heavy one and allocated staff accordingly, but the reality was the revers Another unpleasant surprise was the hotel breakfast debacle. "We were told that Europeans 'don't take breakfast, the restaurants," recalled one Disney executive. "And guess what? Everybody showed up for the hotels. The lines were breakfast. We were trying to serve 2,500 breakfasts in a 350-seat restaurant at some of horrendous. Moreover, they didn't want the typical French breakfast of croissants and coffee, which was our assumption. They wanted bacon at 12:30. The crowds were huge. Our s behavior modification' to teach them that they could eat lunch at 11:00 AM or 2:00 PM. and eggs." Lunch turned out to be another problem. "Everybody wanted lunch miling cast members had to calm down surly patrons and engage in some were major staffing problems too. Disney tried to use the same teamwork model with its staff that had s Japan, but it ran into trouble in France. In the first nine weeks of Euro-Dis neyland's operation, roughly 1,000 employees, 10 percent of the total, left. One former employee was a 22-year- old medical student from a nearby town who signed up for a weekend job. After two days of "brainwashing." as he called Disney's training, be left following a dispute with his supervisor over the timing of his lunch hour Another former employee noted, "I don't think that they realize what Europcans are like. .. and don't think all the same way." One of the biggest problems, however, was that Europeans didn't stay at the park as long as Disney expected. While Disney succeeded in getting close to 9 million visitors a year through the park most stayed only a day or two. Few stayed the four to five days that Disney had hoped for. It seems that most Europeans regard theme parks as places for day excursions. A theme park is just not seen as a destination for an that we ask question gates, in line with its plans, Hill, Charles W.L. (2000). Disney in France. In International Business, Competing in the Global Marketplace. Irwin McGraw Hill, pp. 106-107Explanation / Answer
1.The following are the assumptions that Disney made about the tastes and preferences of French consumers among which most of them went wrong .They are
A.Disney avoided serving alcohol in the park but the French culture was to have a glass of wine along with lunch.
B.Disney thought Monday would be the light day and the visitors would be less and Friday would be the heavy day with more visitors but the opposite happened in the park.
C.The Disney were informed that French people do not prefer breakfast so only a few restaurants were opened but to their surprise French consumers logged in for breakfast and they had to wait in que for a long time which caused confusions.
D.French people expected their lunch by 12.30 which otherwise was planned a little later.
E.For French people vacation or visiting a park was only for a day or for a few hours .The Disney went wrong in assuming that they would stay for a few days and many luxury hotels were built around.
2.The main reason why Disney chose to build the park in French was for its demographics and subsidiaries offered by the government.Disney believed in the concept that Paris was of rich and highly cultured and people would flow in from Paris and French. But it all went wrong.Disney should have given more imporimportance and a deeper study to analyse the culture of the Nation and their symbols.The deeply imbibed cultural Parisians considered that Disney's dream was an assault on their culture.They considered that the dominance of America was brought forth by this construction.Another important aspect that should have been studied by the Disney should have been the source of subsidies offered by the French government .On the day of grand opening farmers protested against the theme park with their trucks demanding their need for subsidies refused by the government.Even the minister of culture also announced of boycott on the day of grand opening. All these are major issues and aspects that Disney should have taken care of and avoided in the early stages so that the opening would have had positive vibrations.
3.Demographically France is the best choice for location of euro-Disney. It was a cultural hub and a convenient place for everyone to visit.It offered good location with all the facilities needed to survive.Disney slowly succeeded after an initial experience and also changing its strategies.
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