“Want to reform campaign finance and reduce corruption? Here’s how.” The Washing
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“Want to reform campaign finance and reduce corruption? Here’s how.”
The Washington Post
By Ray LaRaja and Brian Schaffner October 26, 2015
¶1 The Monkey Cage often hosts point-counterpoint articles on campaign finance reform. Here’s the classic problem: How do you reconcile, on the one hand, the need for money to support free speech and robust political campaigns — and, on the other hand, the possibility that rich donors might unfairly influence or corrupt officeholders? Reform advocates usually emphasize one concern or the other.
¶2 On one side, some defend the approach taken in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002, popularly known as McCain-Feingold. That law aimed to end corruption by limiting how much money individuals could donate to political parties. It capped contributions to federal candidates to as low as $2,000 per election.
¶3 On the other side, some argue that such a low ceiling on donations is unrealistic. Modern political campaigns can cost up to $5 million for a Congressional race and more than $1 billion for a presidential one. Those who want to influence politics, this group argues, will just find other ways to pour money into the system, resulting in unintended consequences like super PACs.
Stronger political parties could bring us a more practical and pluralist approach to governing
¶4 But is there another way? A provocative new paper from two election law experts at the Brennan Center, known for promoting political equality, suggests some potential common ground. Authors Ian Vandewalker and Daniel Weiner want to strengthen political parties, arguing that those institutions are best able to hold candidates accountable. As a result, the reforms that they suggest involve channeling money to candidates through the parties instead of interest groups.
¶5 Here’s the idea: Party institutions are vital in reaching voters and getting citizens involved in campaigns. But parties, the authors argue, are being eclipsed by the unlimited finances of “shadow” groups supported by billionaires. Vandewalker and Weiner argue that the formal party committees are better for democracy because they have strong electoral incentives to be responsive to the broadest set of citizens possible. Historically, they’ve worked to engage citizens in volunteering, attending party events and, most important, voting.
¶6 Interest groups, in contrast, put more emphasis on a narrow set of issues tailored to their select group of (usually wealthy) members. For this reason, the authors strongly suggest allowing parties to raise more funds by including them in a small-donor “matching” programs like that in New York City, which multiplies a small private donation with public money. In addition to sending more financing to the parties, the authors would reduce or remove current restrictions on allowing the parties to support their candidates with more money and in-kind support.
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¶7 Outside Washington, revitalized parties could encourage greater political pluralism. That is to say, when parties function as “big tents,” they can be moderating forces. “Big tent” parties affirm and balance the diverse values and interests in American society. They do that through brokering agreements among competing groups and forming broad governing coalitions.
Common ground on reform
¶8 We agree. In our recent book, we show that financially strong parties may help tone down extremism because parties consider who is most likely to get elected in the general election — and therefore invest in the more moderate candidates, candidates who the more activist donors might reject as wishy-washy. That would result in a Congress that’s less polarized, more pragmatic, and more willing to find compromises to get things done.
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¶9 The high demand for money in U.S. elections combined with unrealistically low contribution limits to parties and candidates results in the siphoning of money toward super PACs and other opaque groups. Thomas Edsall describes this situation as a “kind of lawlessness” with a two-class structure of election financing. The first is the traditional federally regulated system that encourages small donors. The second is a combination of super PACs and tax exempt groups that can operate without contribution limits (and often without revealing donors), supported by the most wealthy citizens and interest groups.
¶10 Not only must reformers tout the benefits of financially strong parties, but they must also convince voters that parties will not simply become conduits for rich donors. This is where Brennan Center’s promotion of public financing for parties might gain some traction. It allays concerns about the corrupting influence of large donations to parties.
¶11 To its credit, the Brennan Center paper avoids talk of sweeping reforms and constitutional amendments, which are untested and unlikely to pass. Critically, the proposals create space for bipartisan compromise since leadership in both major parties would prefer to have campaign funds flow through party organizations they control. We hope leaders recognize this opportunity and begin to give shape to reforms that strengthen the political parties.
“Want to reform campaign finance and reduce corruption? Here’s How.”
Please read the article above and answer the questions. After you read the article, answer the following questions, in your own words. Please do not use any quotes from the article. (I have numbered the paragraphs and included asterisks everywhere I cut text out).
What was the unintended consequence of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) (as described in ¶ 1-3)?
Why do Vandewalker and Weiner believe that it would be better to channel more money through political parties rather than interest groups (as discussed in ¶ 4-6)? (What is the difference between political parties and interest groups, and how does that matter for this argument?)
In ¶ 7, the authors suggest that “big tent” parties can be “moderating forces.” What do they mean?
Explain what Edsall means when he describes our system of campaign financing as a “kind of lawlessness” in ¶ 9.
Most observers, pundits and political scientists who worry about the corrupting influence of money in politics argue that we need greater restrictions on campaign donations and spending. This is not what they authors of this article argue. When you think about the Supreme Court’s current understanding of free speech and campaign financing, do you believe the authors’ proposal is more or less likely to be upheld by the Supreme Court, and why?
PLEASE WRITE ALL THE ANSWERS IN DETAIL AND LONG.
Explanation / Answer
Supreme Court in the case Republican Party of Louisiana v. Federal Election Commission, US had upheld federal restrictions on soft money campaign offerings to state and local political parties. Soft money may comprise of corporate and union contributions and unrestricted individual contributions provided if allowed by state law.
The federal Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) also acknowledged as McCain-Feingold law indeed also facilitated to effectively prohibit soft money to national political parties and thus eventually laying down tough restrictions on soft money to state and local parties used to manipulate federal elections.
Bopp from Bopp Law Firm had indeed lead several cases countrywide seeking to strike down campaign finance restrictions on First Amendment grounds. Furthermore he enumerated preceding cases urging Supreme Court to overrule soft-money restrictions by contending that the wide-ranging kind of corruption acknowledged by Supreme Court in McConnell has been lessened by more recent rulings.
US Solicitor General Jeffrey B. Wall filed government’s motion which cited the Supreme Court ruling in 2003 in McConnell v. FEC which effectively elucidated that restrictions on political party contributions are indeed justified because parties are strongly attached with federal candidates and unrestricted party contributions indeed can corrupt contestants and officeholders. Furthermore it effectively facilitated to reflect Trump administration Justice Department support to long-standing campaign finance laws confining soft-money contributions to political parties.
Tara Malloy deputy executive director of Campaign Legal Center (CLC) had effectively elucidated that without soft money restrictions political parties indeed would become a source through which big donors would endeavor to manipulate elected officials and their policy decisions. Furthermore CLC along with Public Citizen nonprofit organizations had indeed supported restrictions on campaign money and thus eventually had urged Supreme Court to uphold restrictions on political party soft money.
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