When all is said and done, which may not be for many years, it\'s likely to be o
ID: 448291 • Letter: W
Question
When all is said and done, which may not be for many years, it's likely to be one of the worst environmental disasters, if not the worst, in U.S. history^44. British petroleum's (BP) Deepwater Horizon offshore rig in the Gulf of Mexico exploded in a ball of flames on April 20,2010, killing 11 employees. This initial tragedy set in motion frantic efforts to stop the flow of oil, followed by a long and arduous cleanup process. Although the impacts of the explosion and oil spill were felt most intensely by businesses and residents along the coast and by coastal wildlife, those of us inland who watched the disaster unfold were also stunned and dismayed by what we saw happening. What led to this disaster, and what should BP do to minimize the likelihood of it ever happening again? One thing that has come to light in the disaster investigation is that it's no surprise that something like this happened. After Hurricane Dennis blew through in July 2005, a passing ship was shocked to see BP's new massive $1 billion Thunder Horse oil platform ldquo listing precariously to one side, looking for all the world as if it were about to sink. rdquo Thunder Horse ldquo was meant to be the company's crowning glory, the embodiment of its bold gamble to outspace its competitors in finding and exploiting the vast reserves of oil beneath the waters of the gulf rdquo. But the problems with this rig soon became evident. A valve installed backwards caused it to flood during the hurricane even before any oil had been pumped. Other problems included a wekling job so shoddy that it left underwater pipelines brittle and full of cracks. ldquo The problems at Thunder Horse were not an anomaly, but a warming that BP was taking too many risks and cutting comers in pursuit of growth and profits. rdquo Then came the tragic explosion on the Deepwater Horizon. Before the rig exploded, there were strong warning signs that something was terribly wrong with the oil well. Among the red flags were several equipment readings suggesting that gas was bubbling into the well, a potential sign of an impending blowout. Those red flags were ignored. Other decisions made in the 24 hours before the explosion included a critical decision to replace heavy mud in the pipe rising from the seabed with seawater, again possibly increasing the risk of an explosion. Internal BP documents also show evidence of serious problems and safety concerns with Deepwater. Those problems involved Use well easing and blowout preventer. One BP senior drilling engineer warned. ldquo This would certainly he a worst-ease scenario.rdquo The federal panel charged with investigating the spill examined 20 ldquo anomalies in the well's behavior and the crew's response. rdquo The panel is also investigating in particular why ldquo rig workers missed telltale signs that the well was close to an uncontrolled blowout. rdquo The panel's final report blamed both BP and its contractors for the failures that led to the explosion on the Deepwater Horizon. Many of those failing stemmed from shortcuts to save time and money. However, the report also faulted the government for tax oversight of the companies. What type(s) of control-feedforward, concurrent, or feedback -do you think would have been most useful in this situation? Explain your choice(s). Using Exhibit 14-2, explain what BP could have done better Why do you think company employees ignored the red flags? How could such behavior be changed in the future? What could other organizations learn from BP'S mistakes?Explanation / Answer
What type of control - feedforward , concurrent or feedback - do you think would have been most useful in this situation ? Also Explain choice?
Feed forward organize would have been the the majority useful type of control in this state of affairs. The Deepwater Horizon accident had enormous implications for the health of personnel and nearby residents, the financial system, and the environment. BP had a liability to take the potential peril of their drilling operation gravely and plan for potential evils. There should have been backup shield to prevent accidents like the one that happen. At the very least they should have accomplished concurrent control. At the first cipher of a problem they should have taken what actions were required to prevent the type of adversity that occurred.
2. Using Exhibit 14-2, explain what BP could have done better.
First the company wanted to measure their actual presentation. They needed to seem at their practices and examine the data that they were in receipt of from engineers on the site to decide whether or not the labor was being completed in the good manner. Once this data was composed it needed to be examine in an objective way and contrast to both the internal principles and the external system set by governing bodies for oil drilling operations. When subject were discovered they needed to be taken gravely by people at all levels of the company and suitable action needed to be taken to prevent the explosion, which rare both BP employees and inhabitants in the area. Management wanted to act quickly and in anything manner was necessary to stop the identified problems from rising.
In this case, the operators could have done a improved job of monitoring the force in the well and shut the well downward before the explosion. on one occasion the bang occurred, the size of the fall should have been deliberate correctly and instant steps taken to cap the well (for more than a few days the well’s proprietor did not know if the well was seep out from the bottom). It took months longer to limit the well than at first thought. The treatment of information concerning environmental and financial impact was slow at first and the corporation did not put the populace and resources in place to watch the impact of the spill and take deed to insure the public of what was organism doing to solve the crisis.
3. Why do you think company employees ignored the red flags? How could such behavior be changed in the future?
In a number of respects, the Deepwater prospect was new expertise. While there are thousands of oil wells in the Gulf of Mexico, there are fewer than a dozen as deep as the Deepwater prospect. luckily, some of those wells used copy and triplicate systems. In the case of the Deepwater prospect, there was only one binge preventer on the ocean floor – where extra deepwater wells use two. Industry and administration pressure will cover that technology and processes alter in response to this occasion.
4. What could other organizations learn from BP’s mistakes?
Periodically, tragedy like the Deepwater prospect remind companies of the hazard that their mistakes pose to the surroundings, society, and the industry. Companies and their top organization teams turn out to be complacent – they believe that it could not happen to them. It is from these blunder that companies learn to put better organization and response procedure into place.
Related Questions
drjack9650@gmail.com
Navigate
Integrity-first tutoring: explanations and feedback only — we do not complete graded work. Learn more.