(5 points) Some quick and easy questions. State whether true or false and give a

Question

(5 points) Some quick and easy questions. State whether true or false and give a consise explanation (for some questions, an example/counterexample is sufficient). Each question below is worth 1 point (a) A finitely repeated prisons' dilemma game with a known terminal horizon cannot sustain cooper ation between the two prisoners in a subgame perfect equilibrium (b) An evolutionary situation that can be represented as a strict Nash equilibrium of a normal form game is evolutionarily stable even if the Nash equilibrium is not unique. (c) All subgame perfect equilibria are also Nash equilibria (d) If a game does not have any proper subgames (i.e. smaller than the entire game), the set of Nasih (e) All normal form games have a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium

Explanation / Answer

a)

In Prisoner s dilemma ther is only one dominant strategy and which is Nash equillibria and would remain the same for all subgames in finitely repeated games hence correcr is the answer

True

c)

All subgame perfect nash equillibria are nash eqillibrinn as to solve a finitely repeated games we try to find NE at each subgame of game

D)

Simultaneous game have no proper subgames and thus every nash equillibria is subgame oerfect

E)

False

Only for finite games it is npacted

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