(5 points) Some quick and easy questions. State whether true or false and give a
ID: 1127429 • Letter: #
Question
(5 points) Some quick and easy questions. State whether true or false and give a consise explanation (for some questions, an example/counterexample is sufficient). Each question below is worth 1 point. (a) A finitely repeated prisons' dilemma game with a known terminal horizon cannot sustain cooper- ation between the two prisoners in a subgame perfect equilibrium (b) An evolutionary situation that can be represented as a strict Nash equilibrium of a normal form game is evolutionarily stable even if the Nash equilibrium is not unique. (c) All subgame perfect equilibria are also Nash equilibria (d) If a game does not have any proper subgames (i.e. smaller than the entire game), the set of Nasih and subgame perfect equilibria coincide (e) All normal form games have a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.Explanation / Answer
a. True, as it cannot sustain co-operation within the two prisioners in a subgame of the perfect equilibrium.
b. True, Evolutionary situation occur even if the Nash Equilibrium is not unique.
c. True, as all the subgames perfect equilibria are consider in the Nash equilibria.
d. False, as it doesn't consider in the Nash Equilibrium.
e. True, as in the Nash Equilibrium all the normal form games have the mixed strategy.
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