Consider the following abstract game, where player 1 is the \"row\" plaeyr, adn

Question

Consider the following abstract game, where player 1 is the "row" plaeyr, adn can choose between the strategies T, M and B (for top, middle and bottom, respectively); and player 2, the "column player", can choose between L,C,R (for left, centre and right, respectively)
L C R
T 2,1 0,0 1,1
M 0,0 1,2 1,1
B 1,1 0,1 2,0


6.1. Is "B,R" a Nash equilibrium?

A. Yes, because R is a dominant strategy for player 2.

B. No, because for player 2 the best reply to B is to choose either L or C.

C. Yes, because playing B is the best reply for player 1.

D. No, because for player 2 C is a dominant strategy.
6.2 How many Nash equilibria does this game have?

6.3 What are the Nash equilibria of this game?

A. "2,0" and "1,2".

B. There are no Nash equilibria.

C. "T,L", "M,C" and "B,R".

D. "T,L" and "M,C".

Explanation / Answer

Answer is 0,0 on the 1 row

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