The Not-So-Wonderful World of EuroDisney * —Things Are Better Now at Disneyland
ID: 331017 • Letter: T
Question
The Not-So-Wonderful World of
EuroDisney
*
—Things Are Better Now at
Disneyland Resort Paris
CASE 2-1
BONJOUR, MICKEY!
In April 1992, EuroDisney SCA opened its doors to European visi-
tors. Located by the river Marne some 20 miles east of Paris, it
was designed to be the biggest and most lavish theme park that
Walt Disney Company (Disney) had built to date—bigger than
Disneyland in Anaheim, California; Disneyworld in Orlando,
Florida; and Tokyo Disneyland in Japan.
Much to Disney management’s surprise, Europeans failed to “go
goofy” over Mickey, unlike their Japanese counterparts. Between
1990 and early 1992, some 14 million people had visited Tokyo
Disneyland, with three-quarters being repeat visitors. A family of
four staying overnight at a nearby hotel would easily spend $600 on
a visit to the park. In contrast, at EuroDisney, families were reluc-
tant to spend the $280 a day needed to enjoy the attractions of the
park, including les hamburgers and les milkshakes. Staying over-
night was out of the question for many because hotel rooms were
so high priced. For example, prices ranged from $110 to $380 a
night at the Newport Bay Club, the largest of EuroDisney’s six new
hotels and one of the biggest in Europe. In comparison, a room in a
top hotel in Paris cost between $340 and $380 a night.
Financial losses became so massive at EuroDisney that the
president had to structure a rescue package to put EuroDisney
back on firm financial ground. Many French bankers questioned
the initial financing, but the Disney response was that their views
reflected the cautious, Old World thinking of Europeans who did
not understand U.S.-style free market financing. After some acri-
monious dealings with French banks, a two-year financial plan
was negotiated. Disney management rapidly revised its marketing
plan and introduced strategic and tactical changes in the hope of
“doing it right” this time.
A Real Estate Dream Come True
The Paris loca-
tion was chosen over 200 other potential sites stretching from
Portugal through Spain, France, Italy, and into Greece. Spain
thought it had the strongest bid based on its yearlong, temperate,
and sunny Mediterranean climate, but insufficient acreage of land
was available for development around Barcelona.
In the end, the French government’s generous incentives,
together with impressive data on regional demographics, swayed
Disney management to choose the Paris location. It was calculated
that some 310 million people in Europe live within two hours’ air
travel of EuroDisney, and 17 million could reach the park within
two hours by car—better demographics than at any other Disney site.
Pessimistic talk about the dismal winter weather of northern France
was countered with references to the success of Tokyo Disneyland,
where resolute visitors brave cold winds and snow to enjoy their
piece of Americana. Furthermore, it was argued, Paris is Europe’s
most-popular city destination among tourists of all nationalities.
Spills and Thrills
Disney had projected that the new
theme park would attract 11 million visitors and generate over
$100 million in operating earnings during the first year of
operation. By summer 1994, EuroDisney had lost more than
$900 million since opening. Attendance reached only 9.2 million
in 1992, and visitors spent 12 percent less on purchases than the
estimated $33 per head.
If tourists were not flocking to taste the thrills of the new Euro-
Disney, where were they going for their summer vacations in 1992?
Ironically enough, an unforeseen combination of transatlantic air-
fare wars and currency movements resulted in a trip to Disneyworld
in Orlando being cheaper than a trip to Paris, with guaranteed good
weather and beautiful Florida beaches within easy reach.
EuroDisney management took steps to rectify immediate prob-
lems in 1992 by cutting rates at two hotels up to 25 percent, intro-
ducing some cheaper meals at restaurants, and launching a Paris ad
blitz that proclaimed “California is only 20 miles from Paris.”
An American Icon
One of the most worrying aspects of
EuroDisney’s first year was that French visitors stayed away; they
had been expected to make up 50 percent of the attendance figures.
A park services consulting firm framed the problem in these words:
“The French see EuroDisney as American
imperialism—plastics
at its worst.” The well-known, sentimental Japanese attachment
to Disney characters contrasted starkly with the unexpected and
widespread French scorn for American fairy-tale characters.
French culture has its own lovable cartoon characters such as
Ast
é
rix, the helmeted, pint-sized Gallic warrior, who has a theme
park located near EuroDisney.
Hostility among the French people to the whole “Disney idea”
had surfaced early in the planning of the new project. Paris theater
director Ariane Mnouchkine became famous for her description of
EuroDisney as “a cultural Chernobyl.” In fall 1989, during a visit
to Paris, French Communists pelted Michael Eisner with eggs. The
joke going around at the time was, “For EuroDisney to adapt prop-
erly to France, all seven of Snow White’s dwarfs should be named
Grumpy (Grincheux).”
Early advertising by EuroDisney seemed to aggravate local
French sentiment by emphasizing glitz and size rather than
the variety of rides and attractions. Committed to maintaining
Disney’s reputation for quality in everything, more detail was
built into EuroDisney. For example, the centerpiece castle in the
Magic Kingdom had to be bigger and fancier than in the other
parks. Expensive trams were built along a lake to take guests from
the hotels to the park, but visitors preferred walking. Total park
construction costs were estimated at FFr 14 billion ($2.37 billion)
in 1989 but rose by $340 million to FFr 16 billion as a result of
all these add-ons. Hotel construction costs alone rose from an esti-
mated FFr 3.4 billion to FFr 5.7 billion.
*The Official name has been changed from “EuroDisney” to “Disneyland Resort Paris.”
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EuroDisney and Disney managers unhappily succeeded in
alienating many of their counterparts in the government, the
banks, the ad agencies, and other concerned organizations. A
barnstorming, kick-the-door-down attitude seemed to reign among
the U.S. decision makers: “They had a formidable image and con-
vinced everyone that if we let them do it their way, we would all
have a marvelous adventure.” One former Disney executive voiced
the opinion, “We were arrogant—it was like ‘We’re building the
Taj Mahal and people will come—on our terms.’ ”
STORM CLOUDS AHEAD
Disney and its advisors failed to see signs at the end of the 1980s
of the approaching European recession. Other dramatic events
included the Gulf War in 1991, which put a heavy brake on vacation
travel for the rest of that year. Other external factors that Disney
executives have cited were high interest rates and the devaluation
of several currencies against the franc. EuroDisney also encoun-
tered difficulties with regard to competition—the World’s Fair in
Seville and the 1992 Olympics in Barcelona were huge attractions
for European tourists.
Disney management’s conviction that it knew best was dem-
onstrated by its much-trumpeted ban on alcohol in the park.
This rule proved insensitive to the local culture, because the
French are the world’s biggest consumers of wine. To them a
meal without un verre de rouge is unthinkable. Disney relented.
It also had to relax its rules on personal grooming of the pro-
jected 12,000 cast members, the park employees. Women were
allowed to wear redder nail polish than in the United States,
but the taboo on men’s facial hair was maintained. “We want
the clean-shaven, neat and tidy look,” commented the director
of Disney University’s Paris branch, which trains prospective
employees in Disney values and culture. EuroDisney’s manage-
ment did, however, compromise on the question of pets. Special
kennels were built to house visitors’ animals. The thought of
leaving a pet at home during vacation is considered irrational by
many French people.
Plans for further development of EuroDisney after 1992 were
ambitious. The initial number of hotel rooms was planned to be
5,200, more than in the entire city of Cannes on the C
ô
te d’Azur.
Also planned were shopping malls, apartments, golf courses, and
vacation homes. EuroDisney would design and build everything
itself, with a view to selling at a profit. As a Disney executive
commented, “Disney at various points could have had partners to
share the risk, or buy the hotels outright. But it didn’t want to give
up the upside.”
“From the time they came on, Disney’s Chairman Eisner and
President Wells had never made a single misstep, never a mistake,
never a failure,” said a former Disney executive. “There was a ten-
dency to believe that everything they touched would be perfect.”
The incredible growth record fostered this belief. In the seven
years before EuroDisney opened, they took the parent company
from being a company with $1 billion in revenues to one with
$8.5 billion, mainly through internal growth.
Telling and Selling Fairy Tales
Mistaken assump-
tions by the Disney management team affected construction
design, marketing and pricing policies, and park management, as
well as initial financing. Disney executives had been erroneously
informed that Europeans don’t eat breakfast. Restaurant breakfast
service was downsized accordingly, and guess what? “Everybody
showed up for breakfast. We were trying to serve 2,500 breakfasts
in a 350-seat restaurant [at some of the hotels]. The lines were
horrendous. And they didn’t just want croissants and coffee, they
wanted bacon and eggs.”
In contrast to Disney’s American parks, where visitors typically
stay at least three days, EuroDisney is at most a two-day visit.
Energetic visitors need even less time. One analyst claimed to have
“done” every EuroDisney ride in just five hours. Typically many
guests arrive early in the morning, rush to the park, come back to
their hotel late at night, and then check out the next morning before
heading back to the park.
Vacation customs of Europeans were not taken into consider-
ation. Disney executives had optimistically expected that the
arrival of their new theme park would cause French parents to take
their children out of school in mid-session for a short break. It
did not happen unless a public holiday occurred over a weekend.
Similarly, Disney expected that the American-style short but more
frequent family trips would displace the European tradition of a
one-month family vacation, usually taken in August. However,
French office and factory schedules remained the same, with their
emphasis on an August shutdown.
In promoting the new park to visitors, Disney did not stress the
entertainment value of a visit to the new theme park; the emphasis
was on the size of the park, which “ruined the magic.” To counter
this, ads were changed to feature Zorro, a French favorite, Mary
Poppins, and Aladdin, star of the huge moneymaking movie
success. A print ad campaign at that time featured Aladdin,
Cinderella’s castle, and a little girl being invited to enjoy a “magic
vacation” at the kingdom where “all dreams come true.” Six new
attractions were added in 1994, including the Temple of Peril,
Story book Land, and the Nautilus attraction. Donald Duck’s
birthday was celebrated on June 9—all in hopes of positioning
EuroDisney as the number 1 European destination of short
duration, one to three days.
Faced with falling share prices and crisis talk among share-
holders, Disney was forced to step forward in late 1993 to rescue
the new park. Disney announced that it would fund EuroDisney
until a financial restructuring could be worked out with lenders.
However, it was made clear by the parent company, Disney, that it
“was not writing a blank check.”
In June 1994, EuroDisney received a new lifeline when a mem-
ber of the Saudi royal family agreed to invest up to $500 million
for a 24 percent stake in the park. The prince has an established
reputation in world markets as a “bottom-fisher,” buying into
potentially viable operations during crises when share prices
are low. The prince’s plans included a $100 million convention
center at EuroDisney. One of the few pieces of good news about
EuroDisney is that its convention business exceeded expectations
from the beginning.
MANAGEMENT AND NAME CHANGES
Frenchman Philippe Bourguignon took over at EuroDisney as
CEO in 1993 and was able to navigate the theme park back to prof-
itability. He was instrumental in the negotiations with the firm’s
bankers, cutting a deal that he credits largely for bringing the park
back into the black.
Perhaps more important to the long-run success of the ven-
ture were his changes in marketing. The pan-European approach
to marketing was dumped, and national markets were targeted
separately. This new localization took into account the differing
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Part 6 Supplementary Material
tourists’ habits around the continent. Separate marketing offices
were opened in London, Frankfurt, Milan, Brussels, Amsterdam,
and Madrid, and each was charged with tailoring advertising and
packages to its own market. Prices were cut by 20 percent for park
admission and 30 percent for some hotel room rates. Special pro-
motions were also run for the winter months.
The central theme of the new marketing and operations
approach is that people visit the park for an “authentic” Disney
day out. They may not be completely sure what that means, except
that it entails something American. This approach is reflected in
the transformation of the park’s name. The “Euro” in EuroDisney
was first shrunk in the logo, and the word “land” added. Then in
October 1994 the “Euro” was eliminated completely; the park was
next called Disneyland Paris; and now Disneyland Resort Paris.
In 1996, Disneyland Paris became France’s most visited tourist
attraction, ahead of both the Louvre Art Museum and the Eiffel
Tower. In that year, 11.7 million visitors (a 9 percent increase from
the previous year) allowed the park to report another profit.
THEME PARK EXPANSION IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
With the recovery of Disneyland Paris, Disney embarked on an
ambi
tious growth plan. In 2001 the California Adventure Park was
added to the Anaheim complex at a cost of $1.4 billion, and Walt
Disney Studios Theme Park was added to Disneyland Paris. Through
agreements with foreign partners, Disney opened
Disney-Sea in
Tokyo and Disneyland Hong Kong in 2006, and plans are underway
for a theme park in Shanghai scheduled for 2016.
A decade after being slammed for its alleged ignorance of
European ways with EuroDisney, Disney is trying to prove its got-
ten things right the second time around. The new movie-themed
park, Walt Disney Studios adjacent to Disneyland Paris, is designed
to be a tribute to moviemaking—but not just the Hollywood kind.
The Walt Disney Studios blends Disney entertainment and attrac-
tions with the history and culture of European film since French
camera-makers helped invent the motion picture. The park’s gen-
eral layout is modeled after an old Hollywood studio complex, and
some of the rides and shows are near replicas of Disney’s first film
park, Disney-MGM Studios. Rather than celebrating the history
of U.S. Disney characters, the characters in the new theme park
speak six different languages. A big stunt show features cars and
motorcycles that race through a village modeled after the French
resort town of St. Tropez.
Small details reflect the cultural lessons learned. “We made
sure that all our food venues have covered seating,” recalling that,
when EuroDisney first opened, the open-air restaurants offered no
protection from the rainy weather that assails the park for long
stretches of the year.
On the food front, EuroDisney offered only a French sausage,
drawing complaints from the English, Germans, Italians, and
everyone else about why their local sausages weren’t available.
This time around, the park caters to the multiple indigenous cul-
tures throughout Europe—which includes a wider selection of
sausages.
Unlike Disney’s attitude with their first park in France, “Now we
realize that our guests need to be welcomed on the basis of their own
culture and travel habits,” says Disneyland Paris Chief Executive.
Disneyland Paris today is Europe’s biggest tourist attraction—even
more popular than the Eiffel Tower—a turnaround that showed the
park operators’ ability to learn from their mistakes.
The root of Disney’s problems in EuroDisney may be found in
the tremendous success of Japan’s Disneyland. The Tokyo Park
was a success from the first day, and it has been visited by millions
of Japanese who wanted to capture what they perceived as the ulti-
mate U.S entertainment experience.
Disney took the entire U.S. theme park and transplanted it in
Japan. It worked because of the Japanese attachment to Disney
characters. Schools have field trips to meet Mickey and his friends
to the point that the Disney experience has become ingrained in
Japanese life. In the book
Disneyland as Holy Land,
University
of Tokyo professor Masako Notoji wrote: “The opening of Tokyo
Disneyland was, in retrospect, the greatest cultural event in Japan
during the ‘80s.” With such success, is there any wonder that
Disney thought they had the right model when they first went to
France? The Tokyo Disney constitutes a very rare case in that the
number of visitors has not decreased since the opening.
2005—Bankruptcy Pending
In early 2005, Disneyland
Paris was on the verge of bankruptcy. The newest park attraction
at Disneyland Paris, Walt Disney Studies, featured Hollywood-
themed attractions such as a ride called “Armageddon—Special
Effects” based on a movie starring Bruce Willis, flopped. Guests
said it lacked attractions to justify the entrance price, and oth-
ers complained it focused too much on American, rather than
European, filmmaking. Disney blames other factors: the post-9/11
tourism slump, strikes in France, and a summer heat wave in 2003.
The French government came to the aid of Disneyland Paris with a
state-owned bank contribution of around $500 million to save the
company from bankruptcy.
A new Disneyland Paris CEO, a former Burger King executive,
introduced several changes in hopes of bringing the Paris park back
from the edge of bankruptcy. To make Disneyland Paris a cheaper
vacation destination, the CEO lobbied the government to open
up Charles de Gaulle airport to more low-cost airlines. Under his
direction, Disneyland Paris created its first original character tai-
lored for a European audience: the Halloween-themed “L’Homme
Citrouille,” or “Pumpkin Man.” He has also introduced a one-day
pass giving visitors access to both parks in place of two separate
tickets. He is planning new rides, including the Tower of Terror,
and other new attractions. If these changes fail to bring in millions
of new visitors, Disney and the French government might once
again be forced to consider dramatic measures.
Even though French President Jacques Chirac called the spread
of American culture an “ecological disaster” and the French gov-
ernment imposes quotas on non-French movies to offset the influ-
ence of Hollywood and officially discourages the use of English
words such as “e-mail,” Disneyland Paris was important to the
French economy. In light of France’s 10 percent unemployment at
the time, Disneyland Paris is seen as a job-creation success. The
company accounted for an estimated 43,000 jobs and its parks
attracted over 12 million visitors a year, more than the Louvre
Museum and the Eiffel Tower combined. By 2008 Disneyland
Paris was experiencing increases in park attendance, and the turn-
around appeared to be working.
DISNEY’S GREAT LEAP INTO CHINA
Disney’s record with overseas theme parks has been mixed.
Tokyo Disneyland is a smash hit with 25 million visitors a year,
and Disneyland Paris, opened in 1992, was a financial sinkhole
that just now is showing promise of a turnaround. Disney was
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Cases 2 The Cultural Environment of Global Marketing
determined not to make the same cultural and management mis-
takes in China that had plagued Disneyland Paris.
Disney took special steps to make Hong Kong Disneyland cul-
turally acceptable. “Disney has learned that they can’t impose the
American will—or Disney’s version of it—on another continent.”
“They’ve bent over backward to make Hong Kong Disneyland
blend in with the surroundings.” “We’ve come at it with an
American sensibility, but we still appeal to local tastes,” says one
of Hong Kong Disneyland’s landscape architects.
Desiring to bring Disneyland Hong Kong into harmony with
local customs from the beginning, it was decided to observe feng
shui in planning and construction. Feng shui is the practice of
arranging objects (such as the internal placement of furniture) to
achieve harmony with one’s environment. It is also used for choos-
ing a place to live. Proponents claim that feng shui has effects on
health, wealth, and personal relationships.
The park’s designers brought in a feng shui master who rotated
the front gate, repositioned cash registers, and ordered boulders
set in key locations to ensure the park’s prosperity. He even chose
the park’s “auspicious” opening date. New construction was often
begun with a traditional good-luck ceremony featuring a carved
suckling pig. Other feng shui influences include the park’s orienta-
tion to face water with mountains behind. Feng shui experts also
designated “no fire zones” in the kitchens to try to keep the five
elements of metal, water, wood, fire, and earth in balance.
Along with following feng shui principles, the park’s hotels have
no floors that are designated as fourth floors, because 4 is consid-
ered an unlucky number in Chinese culture. Furthermore, the open-
ing date was set for September 12, 2006, because it was listed as an
auspicious date for opening a business in the Chinese almanac.
But the park’s success wasn’t a sure thing. The park received
more than 5 million visitors in its first year but short of its targeted
5.6 million, and the second year was equally disappointing with
attendance dropping nearly 30 percent below forecasts. Many of
those who came complained that it was too small and had little to
excite those unfamiliar with Disney’s cast of characters.
Disneyland is supposed to be “The Happiest Place on Earth,”
but Liang Ning isn’t too happy. The engineer brought his family
to Disney’s new theme park in Hong Kong from the southern
Chinese city of Guangzhou one Saturday in April with high hopes,
but by day’s end, he was less than spellbound. “I wanted to forget
the world and feel like I was in a fairytale,” he says. Instead, he
complains, “it’s just not big enough” and “not very different from
the amusement parks we have” in China. Hong Kong Disneyland
has only 16 attractions and only one a classic Disney thrill ride,
Space Mountain, compared with 52 rides at Disneyland Paris.
After the first year’s lackluster beginning, Disney management
introduced five new attractions and added “It’s a Small World,”
the ride made famous at the flagship Disneyland in Anaheim,
California. A variety of other new entertainment offerings were
due in 2008.
Guests’ lack of knowledge of Disney characters created a
special hurdle in China. Until a few years ago, hardly anyone in
mainland China knew Mickey Mouse and Donald Duck even
existed. Disney characters were banned for nearly 40 years, so
knowledge of Disney lore is limited. China was the first market
where Disney opened a park in which there had been no long-term
relationship with attendees. It was the Chinese consumer who was
expected to understand Disney, or so it seemed. Chinese tourists
unfamiliar with Disney’s traditional stories were sometimes left
bewildered by the Hong Kong park’s attractions.
To compensate for the lack of awareness of Disney characters
and create the mystique of a Disney experience, Disney launched
numerous marketing initiatives designed to familiarize guests
with Disneyland. One of the first buildings upon entering the park
exhibits artwork and film footage of Disney history, from the cre-
ation of Mickey Mouse through the construction of Hong Kong
Disneyland. Tour groups are greeted by a Disney host who intro-
duces them to Walt Disney, the park’s attractions, characters, and
other background information. For example, the character Buzz
Lightyear explains
Toy Story
and the Buzz Lightyear Astro Blaster
attraction.
Even though there were complaints about the park size and the
unfamiliarity of Disney characters, there were unique features built
with the Asian guest in mind that have proved to be very popular.
Fantasy Gardens, one of the park’s original features, was designed
to appeal to guests from Hong Kong and mainland China who love
to take pictures. At five gazebos, photo-happy tourists can always
find Mickey, Minnie, and other popular characters who will sign
autographs and pose for photos and videos. Mulan has her own
pavilion in the garden, designed like a Chinese temple. Mickey
even has a new red-and-gold Chinese suit to wear. Restaurants
boast local fare, such as Indian curries, Japanese sushi, and
Chinese mango pudding, served in containers shaped like Mickey
Mouse heads.
All in all, Hong Kong Disney is Chinese throughout. It’s not so
much an American theme park as Mickey Mouse coming to China.
The atmosphere is uncomplicated and truly family oriented. It is
possible to have a genuine family park experience where six-year-
olds take precedence. However, early advertising that featured the
family missed its mark somewhat by featuring a family consist-
ing of two kids and two parents, which did not have the impact it
was supposed to have, because China’s government limits most
couples to just one child. The error was quickly corrected in a
new TV commercial, which the company says was designed to
“forge a stronger emotional connection with Mickey.” The revised
ad featured one child, two parents, and two grandparents together
sharing branded Disney activities, such as watching a movie and
giving a plush version of the mouse as gifts. “Let’s visit Mickey
together!” says the father in the commercial, before scenes at the
park set to traditional Chinese music.
Many other aspects of the park have been modified to better
suit its Chinese visitors. The cast members are extremely diverse,
understand various cultures, and, in many cases, speak three
languages. Signs, audio-recorded messages, and attractions are
also in several languages. For example, riders can choose from
English, Mandarin, or Cantonese on the Jungle River Cruise.
Disney runs promotions throughout the year. For example, the
“Stay and Play for Two Days” promotion was created mainly to
give mainland tourists a chance to experience the park for a longer
period of time. Because many Chinese tourists cross into Hong
Kong by bus, they arrive at Disneyland mid-day. With this promo-
tion, if a guest stays at a Disneyland hotel and purchases a one-day
ticket, the guest is given a second day at the park for free.
Special Chinese holidays feature attractions and decorations
unique to the holiday. For the February 7, 2008, New Year holiday
(the Year of the Rat), Disney suited up its own house rodents,
Mickey and Minnie, in special red Chinese New Year outfits for
its self-proclaimed Year of the Mouse. The Disneyland Chinese
New Year campaign, which lasts until February 24, features a logo
with the kind of visual pun that only the Chinese might appreciate:
the Chinese character for “luck” flipped upside-down (a New Year
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Part 6 Supplementary Material
tradition), with mouse ears added on top. Inside the park, vendors
hawk deep-fried dumplings and turnip cakes. The parade down
Main Street, U.S.A., is joined by the “Rhythm of Life Procession,”
featuring a dragon dance and puppets of birds, flowers, and fish,
set to traditional Chinese music. And of course there’s the god of
wealth, a relative newcomer to the regular Hong Kong Disneyland
gang, joined by the gods of longevity and happiness, all major
figures in Chinese New Year celebrations.
The Hong Kong park has been reducing its losses since open-
ing, from more than $170 million early on to $92.5 million in
2010 and only $30.5 million in 2011. However, plans to increase
the capacity of the park 23 percent are going forward, with the
new attractions to open in 2014. There are broader implications
for Disney from the performance of the Hong Kong theme park
than just its financial health. From the outset, executives at the
business’s Burbank headquarters viewed Hong Kong Disneyland
as a springboard to promote awareness of the Disney name among
the mainland Chinese population and cement ties with Beijing.
The next theme park is set for Shanghai, and the last thing they
want is a “turkey” in Hong Kong that would undermine their whole
China strategy. The new $4 billion park in Shanghai is scheduled
for completion, also in 2016. Disney will hold a 47 percent stake
there. The new park ultimately will be 50 percent larger than the
Hong Kong park. Even though 330 million Chinese live within a
three-hour drive of Shanghai, the company will have to work very
hard to repeat the successes of the U.S. and Japanese parks’ atten-
dance levels, at well over 20 million visitors per year. The most the
Hong Kong park has attracted is some 6 million visitors.
1. What factors contributed to EuroDisney’s poor performance
during its first year of operation? What factors contributed to
Hong Kong Disney’s poor performance during its first year?
2. To what degree do you consider that these factors were
(a) foreseeable and (b) controllable by EuroDisney,
Hong Kong Disney, or the parent company, Disney?
3. What role does ethnocentrism play in the story of
EuroDisney’s launch?
4. How do you assess the cross-cultural marketing skills
of Disney?
5. Why did success in Tokyo predispose Disney management to
be too optimistic in their expectations of success in France?
In China? Discuss.
6. Why do you think the experience in France didn’t help
Disney avoid some of the problems in Hong Kong?
7. Now that Hong Kong Disney is up and running, will
the Shanghai development benefit from the Hong Kong
experience?
8. Now that Disney has opened Hong Kong Disney and begun
work on the Shanghai location, where and when should it
go next? Assume you are a consultant hired to give Disney
advice on the issue of where and when to go next. Pick three
locations and select the one you think will be the best new
location for “Disneyland X.” Discuss.
9. Given your choice of locale X for the newest Disneyland,
what are the operational implications of the history of
EuroDisney and Disney Hong Kong for the new park?
10. Think forward to 2020 and presume the rough politics and
violence of the MENA region settle down substantially.
Where would be the best location for a Disney park in that
region? Defend your choice.
Explanation / Answer
1. What factors contributed to EuroDisney’s poor performance
during its first year of operation? What factors contributed to
Hong Kong Disney’s poor performance during its first year?
The primary factor seems to be a failure in understanding the culture and consumer behavior of French consumers as well as the marketplace.
The company forced US customs and preferences onto the French consumer ( based on the welcome experience in Tokyo)
Others
Hong Kong poor performance
Here again, failure to understand the consumer played a key role
2. To what degree do you consider that these factors were (a) foreseeable and (b) controllable by EuroDisney, Hong Kong Disney, or the parent company, Disney?
Foreseeable
Several of the factors were foreseeable
Controllable factors
3. What role does ethnocentrism play in the story of
EuroDisney’s launch?
Ethnocentrism is the idea that one’s culture is superior to others and expecting others to adopt it. It played a key role in the failure in Paris and Hongkong. Failure to understand, accept and adopt, formed the root cause of Disney’s poor performing story in Paris
Disney management was affected by ethnocentrism. It though French would accept the way Disney built the park. It assumed that practices that succeeded in their country would also succeed in another country with a different culture
Even the French audience seem to be ethnocentric towards their own culture and hostile towards American culture
4. How do you assess the cross-cultural marketing skills of Disney?
They have exhibited poor cross-cultural marketing skills
Even famous customs of French such as having food with wine have been ignored. After the initial phase, they appointed a French guy as CEO and he brought in cultural adaptation and cross-cultural marketing. There have been improvements
Even after learning from Paris disaster, they seemed to have made silly mistakes (like in the commercial) in Hongkong as it is a widespread fact that one child is the norm there
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