#4 please from the manufacturing process. He plans to send an anonymous inform t
ID: 3717602 • Letter: #
Question
#4 please
from the manufacturing process. He plans to send an anonymous inform the agency of the situation. What would you say to your coworker? email to the EPA to 4. Dr. Jeffrey Wigand is a whistle-blower who was fired from his position o research and development at Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporationin orsidentof interviewed for a segment of the CBS show 60 Minutes in August 1995 made a highly controversial decision not to air the interview as initiall segment was pulled because CBS management was worried about the vaust 1995, but the nehwok ce pres 1993. He was , but the The possibility of a multibillion-dollar lawsuit for tortuous interference; that is, interfering with Wigand's dentiality agreement with Brown& Williamson. The interview finally aired on F 1996, after the Wall Street Journal published a confidential November 1995 deposition that Wigand gave in a Mississippi case against the tobacco industry, which repeated many of the charges he made to CBS. In the interview, Wigand said that Brown & Williamson had scrapped plans to make a safer cigarette and continued to use a flavoring in pipe tobacco that was known to cause cancer in laboratory animals. Wigand also charged that tobacco industry executives testified untruthfully before Congress about tobacco product safety. Wigand suffered greatly for his actions; he lost his job, his home his family, and his friends. February 4 390 Visit Wigand's website at www.jeffreywigand.com and answer the following questions. (You may also want to watch The Insider, a 1999 movie based on Wigand's experience) .What motivated Wigand to take an executive position at a tobacco company and then five years later to denounce the industry's efforts to minimize the health and safety issues of tobacco use? What whistle-blower actions did Dr. Wigand take? If you were in Dr. Wigand's position, what would you have done? 5. You are in the last stages of evaluating lanton vendors for a maior hardware upgrade anExplanation / Answer
Hi,
Please find the answer for your question above:
Wigand found the position at B&W attractive because it enabled him to use his expertise to develop a “safer” cigarette, and hence to use his skills and experience to address a product that, when used as intended, kills. Thus the consequences of his research were profound. The position at B&W was also attractive to him because his wife and two young daughters, ages 2 and 2 months, had family in Louisville and they felt they could have a good life there. Wigand accepted B&W's offer in November 1988. He began working for B&W in January 1989, as its Vice-President of Research and Development in its corporate headquarter offices in Louisville, Kentucky. At this time, B&W was a subsidiary of BATUS, the US holding company but, for all intents and purposes, a direct subsidiary of BAT Industries, formerly British-American Tobacco Company, the second largest tobacco company in
the world. At B&W, wigand focused on learning all aspects of tobacco science and chemistry and directed the development of a product, code-named "Airbus" that was a nontraditional nicotine-delivery device that could cause less disease.
Wigand's first discomforting experience with B&W was early on. As part of his corporate orientation, he was sent to one of B&W’s outside corporate counsels, Shook,Hardy & Bacon, located in Kansas City, Missouri. For 3 days, he was told that the research from numerous Surgeon General Reports and other eminent public health
scientific publications on the human hazards of tobacco was based on flawed science, and that there were no studies linking tobacco use to negative health consequences. The attorneys at Shook, Hardy & Bacon also argued that nicotine was not addictive, and therefore that tobacco use was an autonomous act. This was the first time in his career that he had lawyers interpret the science for him. In fact, during his initial hiring interviews with B&W's executives, they unequivocally expressed that nicotine was highly addictive and that tobacco use caused a myriad of debilitating and fatal diseases. Indeed, it was at these interviews where he first heard the mantra “we are in the nicotine delivery business and tar is the negative baggage.” However, the lawyers were asked Wigand to effectively
ignore these comments, not to mention the scientific research that is replete with findings about the adverse health consequences caused by tobacco. Although Wigand returned to corporate headquarters after this part of his orientation confused, he was not deterred from developing a safer product.
In September of 1989, wigand was part of a Research Policy Group meeting held in Vancouver, British Columbia, where all the high level senior managers of research and development from BAT and BAT-affiliated companies had gathered to develop strategic research priorities and tactical programs. Over the course of several days, they discussed how to make a safer product, how to test a safer product, how to address the passive
smoke issue, the feasibility of a reduced ignition propensity or "fire safe" cigarette, and many other scientific topics. They all knew and articulated that nicotine was addictive and that tobacco use was responsible for a myriad of adverse health consequences. They also expressed the belief that, although they might be able to develop a “safer” product, they could never deliver one that was completely unsafe.
In January 1990, the Chairman of BAT, Sir Patrick Sheehy, summoned all the scientists who had been at the Vancouver meeting, along with the product litigation attorneys from each of the companies, to a meeting in New York. At that meeting, they were informed by the BAT Solicitor General, Stuart Chalfen and attorney Nick Cannar, that a lawyer would be placed at every sequence of scientific communication and
research. This meant that any communications, discussions, reports or notes would be subject to attorney review prior to becoming a permanent document with limited distribution. An elaborate system of mandated lawyer vetting, sequestering and altering scientific documents was instituted as a result of this meeting. In addition, all safer cigarette work was transferred and all further work on that project was transferred overseas to the Southampton R&D facility in the UK.
As Wigand continued to work at B&W, he realized that the company was not interested in making safer products, but only in new finding new adolescent consumers and maximizing profits. Disturbingly, he learned that the culture of the tobacco industry was one in which great importance was placed on keeping the public ignorant about the addictive and lethal nature of tobacco products. The industry most wanted to protect its
fundamental legal and PR platform that tobacco use was not addictive, that tobacco use was a free, consumer choice, and that tobacco use was not the source of the scientifically linked morbidity and mortality.
So, even after only a year at B&W, he was in a quandary as to what to do with what he knew. But he stayed for three more years. Indeed, he did not make the decision to come forward even after witnessing how lawyers helped B&W to obfuscate the truth to the public. Why? he had a wife, two young daughters, one of whom had a serious medical condition requiring good medical insurance coverage, and a mortgage. And there were
perks with his $300,000 a year job, including a car, and all of the usual amenities of a successful executive's position. He was also keenly aware by now of how the industry intimidated defectors, paying legions of lawyers to attack their credibility in an effort to stop their behavior. He wanted no part of that and wanted to protect his family. Wigand's intent was to transition back to the healthcare industry for he had realized he had made a major error in his career. The truth is, had he been assured that his family and he would be adequately protected, he probably would have come forward at this point. But as you will learn, his decision to come forward came much later, after witnessing more disturbing events, and experiencing further turmoil. So, he continued to work at B&W, knowing full well about the fraud that they were perpetrating on the public. He began to investigate health issues relating to the use of tobacco products, including the role played by additives and cigarette design on nicotine
deliveries, the premature deaths caused by tobacco use, and the marketing of tobacco to children. The more he learned, the more he had difficulty looking in the mirror. But there was no obvious outlet to which he could turn, he had a duty to his family. All things considered, he decided that it was best not to rock the boat.
But something significant happened in August 1992. He received a draft copy of a National Toxicology Program (NTP) report on Coumarin. The report classified Coumarin as a carcinogen.In 1954, the FDA banned the use and importation of Coumarin and deleted it from the GRAS list because of its demonstrated animal toxicity. Although the industry finally removed Coumarin during the 1986-1988 time period, they have a long history of using Coumarin in their products. Importantly, when the industry removed Coumarin during the 1986-1988 time period, they only removed this ingredient from cigarettes.
Coumarin, in other words, was still used in other tobacco products such as pipe tobacco. Why did the industry continue to use Coumarin in other products, even though they removed it from cigarettes? The answer is simple. They did not have to. An FDA regulation requires tobacco companies to disclose a list of all additives used in the manufacturing of cigarettes, and cigarettes alone, to the Department of Health and Human Services (US Code: Title 15, Chapter 36, 1965, Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act). Thus, tobacco companies do not have to disclose additives in pipe tobacco, chew or other any other form. So, B&W continued to use Coumarin in pipe
tobacco. Their rationale was simple but disturbing. They reasoned that since the law did not require the disclosure of ingredients in non-cigarette products, then they could use any ingredient in these products, including known carcinogens, with impunity. They felt no moral obligation to make their product "safer" by removing known carcinogens.
After the 1992 NTP report came out, Wigand went to his supervisor, Mr. Sandefeur, the COO/President of B&W. Wigand had been to Mr. Sandefuer many times before on issues of health and safety. They had many disagreements including the use of the company's mantra “hook ‘em young, hook ‘em for life,” and the impropriety of lawyer interference in science, among many others. When Wigand urged Mr. Sandefeur that Coumarin should be
removed from all of B&W's products, he instructed Wigand to go back to the lab and find a substitute for Coumarin. But he also told Wigand that despite evidence that Courmarin was a carcinogen, it would not be removed from pipe tobacco because it would affect the taste of the product and negatively impact sales and profits.
It was at this time that Wigand constructed a memorandum that included the NTP’s findings, a recital of the 1954 FDA ruling, and the validated toxicological data. Also included in the memo, was the argument that the company was bound by a moral imperative that, when possible and feasible, products should be designed so that their
potential to create harm is mitigated. This final issue caused Wigand to be fired in March of 1993 when Mr. Sandefuer was promoted to Chairman/CEO of the company.
II. Wigand exposed the illegal usage of Coumarin by B&W which has been detected as a carcinogen by FDA. He secretly helped the Congress to know more about the tobacco science for which he got threatening calls that his actions could lead to cause physical harm to his daughters.He exposed them through the 60minutes interview with CBS.
III.If I werein Dr.Wigand's position I would have done the same thing by exposing them to public for ruining and playing with people's life and health for their own profits.
Related Questions
Navigate
Integrity-first tutoring: explanations and feedback only — we do not complete graded work. Learn more.