Consider 4 boys: a tug. d and 4 girls: A BC D. The preference ordering for boys
ID: 3766929 • Letter: C
Question
Consider 4 boys: a tug. d and 4 girls: A BC D. The preference ordering for boys and girls is described as below. Find a stable matching using boy-proposing algorithm. Find a stable matching using girl-proposing algorithm. Private value auction Consider 2 bidders: player 1 and 2. You are player 1 and your private value of the object is 0.6. You believe that the value of player 2 is uniformly distributed between [0, 1]. If you win by bidding b, your payoff is 0.6-b. Consider the first price auction. Suppose your opponent bids av_2 with v_2 her valuation. Find your NE bidding strategy and put down your procedure.Explanation / Answer
1)Girls:
A a c d b
B b c a d
C c a d b
D b d a c
Boys:
a B C A D
b D B C A
c D C A B
d B A C D
a) Boy-proposing:
on day 1: a proposes B, b proposes D, c proposes D, d proposes B
B will be married to a(B prefers a to d)
D will be married to b(D prefers b to c)
A->*
B->a
C->*
D->b
on day 2: c proposes C , d proposes A
C will be married to c
A will be married to d
A->d
B->a
C->c
D->b
Algo ends here as no boy is left to get married.
stable matching for boy-proposing is
A->d
B->a
C->c
D->b
b) Girl-proposing:
on day 1: A proposes a, B proposes b, C proposes c, D proposes b
a will be married to A
b will be married to D(b prefers D to B)
c will be married to C
a->A
b->D
c->C
d->*
on day 2: B proposes to c
c rejects B as he prefers C to B.
on day 3: B proposes to a
a will be married to B and a rejects A(a prefers B to A)
a->B
b->D
c->C
d->*
on day 4: A proposes b.
b rejects A.
d will marry A
a->B
b->D
c->C
d->A
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