QUESTION 1 A company that rewards its salespeople based on the number of sales m
ID: 1219220 • Letter: Q
Question
QUESTION 1
A company that rewards its salespeople based on the number of sales made can expect
Higher sales prices
Lower sales prices
No sales
All of the above
2.5 points
QUESTION 2
By threatening to lockout the workers, the firm has
Eliminated half of the strategies
All of the above
Made it in the union’s best interest to not strike
Forced the union to choose the best response in the firm’s best interest
2.5 points
QUESTION 3
For the following questions 8-16 use this setup.
Consider a simultaneous move game between a union and a company. If both the parties bargain hard, each would gain nothing. If only one party bargains hard the accommodating party gets a profit of $1 million while the bargaining party gets a $5 million, while if they both accommodate, they each get $3 million.
What would be the Nash equilibrium of this game?
Bargain hard, bargain hard
Firm bargains hard, union accommodates
Union bargains hard, firm accommodates
Both B&C
2.5 points
QUESTION 4
For the following questions 8-16 use this setup.
Consider a simultaneous move game between a union and a company. If both the parties bargain hard, each would gain nothing. If only one party bargains hard the accommodating party gets a profit of $1 million while the bargaining party gets a $5 million, while if they both accommodate, they each get $3 million.
Is this Nash equilibrium efficient?
Yes, because the sum of payoffs is highest
No, because both the parties can do better
No, because both the parties are maximizing their profits
All of the above
2.5 points
QUESTION 5
For the following questions 8-16 use this setup.
Consider a simultaneous move game between a union and a company. If both the parties bargain hard, each would gain nothing. If only one party bargains hard the accommodating party gets a profit of $1 million while the bargaining party gets a $5 million, while if they both accommodate, they each get $3 million.
Could either party do better?
Yes, one party can do better, but only at the expense of the other
No, neither party can do better
Yes, both parties can do better without hurting each other if they cooperated
No, each party has its best possible outcome
2.5 points
QUESTION 6
For the following questions 8-16 use this setup.
Consider a simultaneous move game between a union and a company. If both the parties bargain hard, each would gain nothing. If only one party bargains hard the accommodating party gets a profit of $1 million while the bargaining party gets a $5 million, while if they both accommodate, they each get $3 million.
If the Union threatens a strike, what is the firm’s best response?
Bargain hard
Hide
Run
Accommodate
2.5 points
QUESTION 7
For the following questions 8-16 use this setup.
Consider a simultaneous move game between a union and a company. If both the parties bargain hard, each would gain nothing. If only one party bargains hard the accommodating party gets a profit of $1 million while the bargaining party gets a $5 million, while if they both accommodate, they each get $3 million.
If the union leader has already sent strikers to the picket line before entering negotiations, the union has
Eliminated half of the strategies of the game
Forced the firm to choose the best response in the union’s best interest
Made it in the firm’s best interest to accommodate their requests
All of the above
2.5 points
QUESTION 8
For the following questions 8-16 use this setup.
Consider a simultaneous move game between a union and a company. If both the parties bargain hard, each would gain nothing. If only one party bargains hard the accommodating party gets a profit of $1 million while the bargaining party gets a $5 million, while if they both accommodate, they each get $3 million.
If the firm hires security guards to enforce a lockout, what are they implying?
They would always accommodate
They would always bargain hard
They would not accommodate
Both B&C
2.5 points
QUESTION 9
If, during the negotiations between the union and the management a strike occurs, it would be because
The union is trying to convince the management that it will stick to its strategy
The management doesn’t believe the union’s threat
All of the above
None of the above
2.5 points
QUESTION 10
If, during the negotiations between the union and the management, a lockout occurs, it would be because
The management is trying to convince the union that it would stick to its strategy
The union believes the management’s threat
All of the above
None of the above
2.5 points
QUESTION 11
If the firm threatens a lockout (and the threat is credible), what is the union’s best response?
Run
Accommodate
Hide
Bargain hard
2.5 points
QUESTION 12
In the strategic sequential labor negotiation game:
The first mover has an advantage
The second mover has an advantage
There is no advantage to either mover
None of the above
2.5 points
QUESTION 13
Jim is haggling with a car dealer, along with another customer, over the sale price of a used car. When he entered the store, the storekeeper was already haggling with the other customer. As Jim makes an offer on the car, the other customer leaves the store, and the storekeeper accepts Jim’s offer. This is because
The storekeeper’s disagreement value decreased
The storekeeper's disagreement value increased
The storekeeper’s disagreement value did not change
None of the above
2.5 points
QUESTION 14
Jim is haggling with a car dealer over the sale price of a used car. When he entered the store, the storekeeper was already haggling with the other customer. His bargaining position could get worse if
The customer leaves
Another customer enters the store, interested in the car
He gets an offer from another seller
All of the above
2.5 points
QUESTION 15
Jim is haggling with a car dealer over the sale price of a used car. When he entered the store he was the only customer. During the negotiations, a second customer walks in and is interested in that particular car. At this point
Jim has a better chance of having his offer accepted, since the seller does not have any outside offers
Jim has lower chances of having his offer accepted, since the seller has more outside offers
The disagreement value for the seller has increased
This should not impact Jim’s chances of having his offer accepted
2.5 points
QUESTION 16
Jim is haggling with a car dealer over the sale price of a used car. When he entered the store he was the only customer. This means that
Jim has a better chance of having his offer accepted, since the seller does not have any outside offers
Jim has lower chances of having his offer accepted, since the seller has more outside offers
The disagreement value for the seller has increased
Only A&C
2.5 points
QUESTION 17
Jim is haggling with a car dealer over the sale price of a used car. When he entered the store, it was empty. During the negotiations, a second customers walks in, interested in that particular car, and the storekeeper rejects Jim’s offer. This is because
The car dealer’s disagreement value decreased
The car dealer’s disagreement value increased
The car dealer’s disagreement value did not change
None of the above
2.5 points
QUESTION 18
Jim is haggling with a car dealer over the sale price of a used car. Which of the following would determine the amount of surplus Jim extracts from the purchase?
Total difference between the buyer’s and seller’s valuations of the car
The number of customers trying to buy that particular car
The number of sellers trying to make Jim a sale
All of the above
2.5 points
QUESTION 19
Jim is haggling with a car dealer on the price of a used car. If the dealer is getting a bonus per sale made, in addition to the commission, the storekeeper’s
Disagreement value increases
Eagerness to agree increases
Disagreement value decreases
Both B&C
2.5 points
QUESTION 20
Jim is haggling with a car dealer on the price of a used car. If the dealer is getting a bonus per sale made, in addition to the commission, Jim is more likely to be able to
Walk away from the deal
All of the above
Pay a higher price for the car
Get the car cheap
2.5 points
QUESTION 21
To save on negotiation costs when buying a car
Always go towards the end of the day, when the seller does not get a chance to make a counteroffer
Threaten to leave if the car dealer says anything but yes to your offer
Carry only one cashier’s check that cannot be modified
All of the above
2.5 points
QUESTION 22
Use questions 16- 27 use the following setup
Consider a sequential game between a shopkeeper and a haggling customer. The party who moves first chooses either a high price ($50) or low price ($20) and the second mover either agrees to the price or walks away from the deal and neither party gets anything. Ignore costs and assume the customer values the item at $60.
If the customer moves first, with a low price what is the best response of the shopkeeper
Shut down your store
Accept the low price
Walk away from the deal
Throw the haggling customer out of your store
2.5 points
QUESTION 23
Use questions 16- 27 use the following setup
Consider a sequential game between a shopkeeper and a haggling customer. The party who moves first chooses either a high price ($50) or low price ($20) and the second mover either agrees to the price or walks away from the deal and neither party gets anything. Ignore costs and assume the customer values the item at $60.
If the customer moves first with a high price what is the best response of the shopkeeper
Throw the haggling customer out of your store
Walk away from the deal
Accept the high price happily
Laugh at the customer’s face
2.5 points
QUESTION 24
Use questions 16- 27 use the following setup
Consider a sequential game between a shopkeeper and a haggling customer. The party who moves first chooses either a high price ($50) or low price ($20) and the second mover either agrees to the price or walks away from the deal and neither party gets anything. Ignore costs and assume the customer values the item at $60.
Looking ahead to how the shopkeeper is more likely to respond what price should the customer more likely to quote?
Low price
A compromised price between the high and the low
Let the shopkeeper quote the price
High price
2.5 points
QUESTION 25
Use questions 16- 27 use the following setup
Consider a sequential game between a shopkeeper and a haggling customer. The party who moves first chooses either a high price ($50) or low price ($20) and the second mover either agrees to the price or walks away from the deal and neither party gets anything. Ignore costs and assume the customer values the item at $60.
If the shopkeeper goes first and quotes a low price, what is the best response of the customer?
Laugh at the storeowner
Walk away from the deal
Accept the low price happily
Slam the storeowner’s door on the way out
2.5 points
QUESTION 26
Use questions 16- 27 use the following setup
Consider a sequential game between a shopkeeper and a haggling customer. The party who moves first chooses either a high price ($50) or low price ($20) and the second mover either agrees to the price or walks away from the deal and neither party gets anything. Ignore costs and assume the customer values the item at $60.
If the shopkeeper goes first and quotes a high price, what is the best response of the customer?
Yell at the store owner
Swear off shopping forever
Walk away from the deal
Accept the high price
2.5 points
QUESTION 27
Use questions 16- 27 use the following setup
Consider a sequential game between a shopkeeper and a haggling customer. The party who moves first chooses either a high price ($50) or low price ($20) and the second mover either agrees to the price or walks away from the deal and neither party gets anything. Ignore costs and assume the customer values the item at $60.
This sequential game illustrates a
Second mover advantage
No advantage based on moves
First mover advantage
Third mover advantage
2.5 points
QUESTION 28
Use questions 16- 27 use the following setup
Consider a sequential game between a shopkeeper and a haggling customer. The party who moves first chooses either a high price ($50) or low price ($20) and the second mover either agrees to the price or walks away from the deal and neither party gets anything. Ignore costs and assume the customer values the item at $60.
Suppose the shopkeeper is known to usher low bidders out of the store even if it means giving up the sale. If the customer moves first, he would
Get ushered out of the store
Offer the high price
Offer the low price
All of the above
2.5 points
QUESTION 29
Use questions 16- 27 use the following setup
Consider a sequential game between a shopkeeper and a haggling customer. The party who moves first chooses either a high price ($50) or low price ($20) and the second mover either agrees to the price or walks away from the deal and neither party gets anything. Ignore costs and assume the customer values the item at $60.
Suppose this customer is known to throw a fit and scare away other customers if charged high prices. If the shopkeeper moves first, he would ask for
A high price
A low price
A pony
All of the above
2.5 points
QUESTION 30
Use questions 16- 27 use the following setup
Consider a sequential game between a shopkeeper and a haggling customer. The party who moves first chooses either a high price ($50) or low price ($20) and the second mover either agrees to the price or walks away from the deal and neither party gets anything. Ignore costs and assume the customer values the item at $60.
Would the customer be able to convince the shopkeeper that he would walk out if he receives a high price?
Yes, because walking out is most profitable move for the customer
No, because walking out is an unprofitable strategy for the customer
No, because walking out is not a credible threat
Both B&C
2.5 points
QUESTION 31
Use questions 16- 27 use the following setup
Consider a sequential game between a shopkeeper and a haggling customer. The party who moves first chooses either a high price ($50) or low price ($20) and the second mover either agrees to the price or walks away from the deal and neither party gets anything. Ignore costs and assume the customer values the item at $60.
Would the shopkeeper be able to convince the customer that he would usher the customer out if he gets a low price?
Both B&C
Yes, such threats are always credible
No, because losing the sale is not in the shopkeeper’s best interest
No, because he would get more by accommodating the low price than losing the sale
2.5 points
QUESTION 32
Use questions 16- 27 use the following setup
Consider a sequential game between a shopkeeper and a haggling customer. The party who moves first chooses either a high price ($50) or low price ($20) and the second mover either agrees to the price or walks away from the deal and neither party gets anything. Ignore costs and assume the customer values the item at $60.
In the strategic view of bargaining the outcome depends on
Who makes the first move
Who can commit to a position
Whether or not the other party can make a countermove
All of the above
2.5 points
QUESTION 33
When buying a car from a dealership, to get the best bargain
Allow the dealership to make the first offer
Keep a cushion of bargaining space in the quoted price
Make a take it or leave it offer
All of the above
2.5 points
QUESTION 34
When buying a car from a dealership, to get the best bargain
Threaten to walk out if the dealer does not accept your offer
Allow room for bargaining
Quote your highest willingness to pay
Never stick to the first offer you make
2.5 points
QUESTION 35
When buying a car from a commission salesman you improve your bargaining position by
shopping toward the beginning of the month
shopping when the showroom is empty of customers
shopping when the new model year cars have just arrived
shopping when the car lot has only few cars left unsold
2.5 points
QUESTION 36
When buying a car from a commission salesman you improve your bargaining position by
shopping when the car lot has many cars left unsold
shopping when the showroom is full of customers
shopping toward the beginning of the month
shopping when the new model year cars have just arrived
2.5 points
QUESTION 37
When buying a car from a commission salesman you improve your bargaining position by
shopping toward the end of the month
shopping when the car lot has very few cars left unsold
shopping when the new model year cars have just arrived
shopping when the showroom is full of customers
2.5 points
QUESTION 38
You are a restaurant owner buying vegetables from a local farmer. You recently found out that another one of the farmer’s clients, a competing restaurant has shut down, what would that do to your bargaining power?
Increase your bargaining power
Decrease your bargaining power
Not affect your bargaining power
None of the above
2.5 points
QUESTION 39
Which of the following will improve your bargaining position when contracting with a supplier
Your final product that includes this component becomes more profitable
You must only buy the raw material from your preferred supplier to ensure quality
You are better able to accommodate other suppliers’ brands
Two of your suppliers merge
2.5 points
QUESTION 40
Which of the following will improve your bargaining position with customers
The product your team produces has become more costly to produce
There are fewer close substitutes for the product your team supports
Your competitors have developed new products that contain more of the features that your team produces
New firms have entered the market with competing products for the ones your team produces
a.Higher sales prices
b.Lower sales prices
c.No sales
d.All of the above
Explanation / Answer
Ans. 1. Lower sales prices (By offering low prices, they can easily met their sales goal)
Ans 2. Forced the union to choose the best response in the firm’s best interest
Ans 9. All of the above.
Ans 10. All of the above.
Ans 11. Accomodate
Ans 12. The first mover has an advantage
Ans 13. The storekeeper's disagreement value increased
Ans 14. He gets an offer from another seller
Ans 15. Jim has lower chances of having his offer accepted, since the seller has more outside offers
As per chegg policy, we cannot answer more than 4 questions. Kidnly repost rest of the questions individually.
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