Consider the following extensive form game of complete and imperfect information

Question

Consider the following extensive form game of complete and imperfect information between players 1, 2, and 3. The following strategy profiles are Subgame Perfect Nash equilibria (Please, select all that apply)

a.

(I, C, X)

b.

(I, B, Y)

c.

(O, B, Y)

d.

(O, B, X)

e.

(I, A, X)

2,2,2 3.2.1 5.0,0 1.2.6 7.5.5 4, 3, 1 and 3. The following strategy profiles are Considor the following extensive form game of complete and imperfect information between plavers 12 Subgame Perfect Nash equilibria (Please, select all that apply) Oc. (O, B, Y)

Explanation / Answer

Answer-

a. (I, C, X): It is a subgame equilibrium , I then C then X is the best option.

b. (I, B, Y): It is a subgame equilibrium, I then B then Y is the best option.

c. (O, B, Y): It is a subgame equilibrium , O is always in equilibrium.

d.(O, B, X):It is a subgame equilibrium  , O is always in equilibrium.

e. (I, A, X): It is a subgame equilibrium , I then A then X is the best option.

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